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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This study has focussed on assessing the significant social and economic costs of the 
2003 bushfires across the Gippsland and North East Regions for both the short and 
medium terms.  The study has also revealed that the bushfires are expected to have 
considerable direct and indirect effects on these regions for the long term (i.e. the next 
two to five years). In total, we estimate that the loss of income and production in the 
Shires of Alpine, East Gippsland, Indigo and Towong from the time of the fires to the 
present (May 2003) to be $121.1 million. 
Our assessment of the social and economic impacts are summarised below. 
The Social Impacts of the Bushfires 
The psychosocial effects of the fires varied within each region depending on the 
locations and proximity to the fires.  
The lengthy time that communities in the vicinity of the fires had to stay alert, to prepare 
for possible fires, and be ready to protect their properties from the fires (up to 20 nights) 
was a marked drain on the physical, social and psychological health of people in those 
communities. 
 
Residents’ health was harmed by, or certainly at risk from, the smoke and haze 
produced by the fires. Certainly, respiratory conditions were exacerbated by these 
conditions. Moreover, individuals involved in fire fighting activities had to cope with the 
prospect of their homes being threatened, and in some cases, burned by the fires during 
their absence.  
 
There was considerable disruption to family life and social links. Children were often sent 
away during the duration of the fires while their parents protected their homes and/or 
fought the fires. 
Local communities and families felt isolated and sometimes assistance was regarded by 
locals as inappropriate.  For example, they were provided with cheques rather than cash 
by government authorities. Road access closures, loss of schooling, mobile library and 
other community services, and broken communication/telephone lines exacerbated the 
feelings of isolation within local communities in the region, especially in areas directly 
impacted by the fires, but to varying degrees by communities threatened by or involved 
in fighting the fires. 
Families also suffered financially because of their involvement in fighting the fires. Many 
people lost income, not just for the duration of the fires, but also in the weeks following. 
 
While the threat of the fires in many ways had the effect of marshalling the resources of 
communities, the fires also had the effect of creating divisions within communities where 
it was perceived that some families/properties were given priority service by fire crews.  
Similarly some businesses were perceived by some to be treated more favorably by fire 
fighters seeking sustenance and short term accommodation (local business operator).  
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People also experienced disruption to their family lives and social links – with some local 
CFA volunteers having been involved in fighting fires in the State since November 2002. 
Children were often separated from their parents for the duration of the fires, partly 
because they were evacuated to relatives in safer locations. 
People celebrated the way their communities worked together. There is a strong sense 
of voluntarism associated with the CFA, Red Cross and St John’s Ambulance in rural 
communities, and this was crucial to enabling communities to mount an immediate 
response to the threat posed by the fires as they broke out. 
In the medium term, the fires have heightened divisions between rural volunteers and 
City professionals, although this does not seem to have dented people’s commitment to 
the principles of voluntarism. 
Similarly, the fires brought out a perceived antipathy towards green politics and 
conservationism, even though these sorts of policies have the potential to help secure a 
sustainable future for regional agriculture and tourism. 
People’s personal financial security has been threatened because fire-fighters 
sometimes lost their second jobs when they did not attend their workplace, and because 
farmers and other business operators lost income and incurred expenses as a result of 
their absence from their workplaces.  As well, some farms have sustained damage that 
has rendered them largely unviable in their current state. 
Non-government industry and tourism associations have played a significant role in 
surveying their members about the impact which the fires have had on their businesses 
and advocating to governments for recovery assistance. 
The media has had a negative impact on communities, in the short term, by heightening 
people’s sense of panic as a result of sensationalist reporting of the fires.  On the other 
hand, people acknowledged that media outlets (press and electronic) had provided 
assistance (sometimes free of charge) to help promote their regions as attractive 
destinations for tourism and investment since the fires – notwithstanding that some 
communities feel that their areas have received insufficient coverage (eg Central 
Gippsland which was not directly burned). 
The fires have revealed how Shire Councils assist rural communities to respond to and 
recover from calamities such as bushfires.  In the immediate term, local governments 
helped by organising communications and logistical support for fire-fighters and by 
providing information to residents about the scale of the threat posed by the fires.  In the 
medium term, we found that local councils have worked effectively with community 
members to: 
• Prepare submissions to federal and state inquiries for recovery assistance; 
• Identify key economic and social impacts; 
• Ensure local physical infrastructure (eg roads, bridges) is reinstated and social 
infrastructure (eg community building) is strengthened; and, 
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• Develop improved fire prevention education and fire fighting and recovery 
organisational structures. 
State government agencies as well as non-government organizations also received 
considerable praise for the many and varied ways they helped to manage and 
implement fire-fighting and recovery efforts in local communities. Feedback also 
suggested, however, a number of improvements that could be made to future 
organization and support activities. 
The Economic Effect of the Bushfires  
The RMIT Research Team estimated the economic effects of the bushfires by examining 
their impact on Gross Shire Products (GShPs). GShP is the Shire equivalent of a 
national economy’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP is the market value of all final 
goods and services produced in an economy over a period of time (usually one year).  
Table 1: ESTIMATED GROSS SHIRE PRODUCTS BY INDUSTRY ($ Million) 
  Alpine LGA East Gippsland LGA Indigo LGA Towong LGA
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $90.7 $140.0 $67.3 $62.1 
Mining $4.2 $9.3 $1.1 $0.0 
Manufacturing $117.7 $92.1 $88.6 $15.2 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $16.7 $8.0 $3.9 $4.5 
Construction $56.0 $64.4 $30.6 $10.6 
Wholesale Trade $38.7 $41.1 $16.3 $8.9 
Retail Trade $115.5 $159.1 $56.3 $18.8 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $129.6 $72.7 $24.6 $9.7 
Transport and Storage $36.2 $34.6 $13.9 $6.0 
Communication Services $15.3 $12.3 $5.6 $2.1 
Finance and Insurance $36.4 $21.4 $8.7 $3.8 
Property and Business Services $103.3 $49.7 $27.4 $5.7 
Government Administration  and Defense $48.7 $38.7 $27.6 $8.2 
Education $52.7 $85.6 $41.8 $16.1 
Health and Community Services $96.3 $108.9 $66.2 $19.6 
Cultural and Recreational Services $49.1 $13.8 $5.6 $2.9 
Personal and Other Services $36.2 $34.9 $13.4 $3.8 
Non-classifiable economic units $11.2 $12.2 $5.2 $3.2 
Not stated $12.0 $22.4 $10.5 $2.6 
          
Total $1,066.6 $1,021.2 $514.7 $203.8 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Note: Excludes Wellington Shire which was not directly burned, but as the report shows, was directly affected. 
It is measured either by using the expenditure approach, or the income approach. The 
expenditure approach involves aggregating all spending on final goods and services 
across the economy, while the income approach requires all income to be summed. 
These two methods are equivalent as that act of production always generates an 
equivalent amount of income.  
Table 1 shows our estimates of GShPs across the various industrial sectors for the four 
Shire in our study. 
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The effect of the bushfires on Gross Shire Product (GShP). 
The economic effects of the bushfires on GShPs were examined both in the short term 
and the medium term. The short term was defined as the period when the threat of the 
bushfires first appeared until after the threat had passed. Given that most communities 
reported fighting bushfires continuously for a period of around one month in January and 
February, we have used four weeks to be the short-term period when economic activity 
was affected.  
The medium term was defined as the period after the threat of the bushfires had passed 
(some time in February) until the time of our investigation (the end of May). Therefore, 
we have used 12 weeks to be the medium term period when economic activity was 
affected by the consequences of the fires. Although we recognise that the economic 
effects of the fires are likely to last for some time into the future, the model we are using 
is not designed for forecasting, therefore we did not attempt to look beyond the present 
in terms of the effects of the fires on economic activity. 
Our approach involved looking at the effects of the bushfires in isolation from other 
factors likely to have affected economic activity in the Shires in recent times. That is, we 
were trying to abstract from the effects of such things as the drought and the general 
tourism downturn due to security concerns. Using economic jargon, we are trying to look 
at the effects of the fires ‘with all other things constant’. To do this we used the 2001-
2002 financial year as our point of comparison. Therefore, we are assuming that 
economic activity in January to May 2002-2003 would have been the same as it was in 
2001-2002 if it were not for the fires, and we are trying to quantify this difference. 
The GShPs, which are our measure of the economic activity, are flow variables. That is, 
GShP is the dollar value of either spending or income earned in a Shire over a period of 
time (usually one year). Although the fires caused substantial damage to both publicly 
and privately owned infrastructure as well as the natural environment, for the purposes 
of this part of the analysis this is not included. This is because infrastructure is a stock 
variable. The fire damage to infrastructure is still important, but for this section of the 
study its relevance is confined to the extent to which fire damage has affected the flow 
variable of GShP. Clearly the loss of infrastructure has had a dramatic effect on many 
communities, and there have been various estimates as to the worth of this loss (by the 
State government as well as the various Shire councils).  However, in this section of the 
report we are only looking at GShP. 
The next step involved estimating the effects of the bushfires on the production levels in 
the various industries across the four Shires. This was done both for the short and 
medium term (as defined above). Even though, in the short term, many people may not 
have been fighting fires for the entire four weeks, we believe it is a reasonable 
assumption that economic activity in the regions was severely affected for this length of 
time, as almost all of the people we obtained information from said that all of the efforts 
of the local communities were devoted to the bushfires over this period. If this were the 
case it is difficult to see how normal economic activity could have occurred over this 
time. 
We have estimated broad-brush changes to economic activity across the different 
sectors within each Shire. These estimates have been derived from information already 
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described in the earlier parts of this report and from our survey results (Appendix 7). 
That is, the information has been obtained from: 
• Focus group meetings and interviews conducted by our researchers in the North 
East and Gippsland regions, see sections 4 and 5 of this report. 
• Information collected by the Victorian Government’s Ministerial Taskforce on 
Bushfire Recovery. 
• Information from the submissions to the Government Inquiries from the Shires of 
Alpine, East Gippsland, Indigo and Towong. 
• Responses to the surveys that we distributed. 
In summary, in the short term we estimated that the effects of the bushfires on output 
levels were as follows: 
• 90 % reductions in output levels in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing in Alpine, 
Indigo and Towong, 
• 80 % reduction in the output level in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing in East 
Gippsland, 
• 90 % reductions in output levels in Construction in Alpine, Indigo and Towong, 
• 80 % reduction in the output level in Construction in East Gippsland, 
• 50 % reduction in output levels in Retail in Alpine, Indigo and Towong, 
• 40 % reduction in the output level in Retail in East Gippsland, 
• 90 % reductions in output levels in Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants in 
Alpine, Indigo and Towong, 
• 80 % reductions in the output levels in Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 
in East Gippsland, 
• 90 % reductions in output levels in Cultural and Recreation Services in Alpine, 
Indigo and Towong, 
• 80 % reductions in the output levels in Cultural and Recreation Services in East 
Gippsland, and 
• 20 % reductions in the output levels in all other industries in all four Shires, with 
the exception of the predominantly public sector and essential services industries 
of Government, Administration and Defence, Eduction, Electricity, Gas and Water 
Supply and Health. In these industries output levels were held constant. 
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Table 2 ALL SHIRES    
ESTIMATED SHORT TERM EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million). 
  GShP Effect  
Alpine LGA $1,066.6 -$33.3  
East Gippsland LGA $1,021.2 -$27.9  
Indigo LGA $514.7 -$14.0  
Towong LGA $203.8 -$7.4  
     
Total $2,806.3 -$82.6  
The data in the Table 2 shows a total reduction in output across all four Shires of $82.6 
million during this four-week period. Although it is true that much of this loss may be  
made up in the subsequent months, for example, there would have been a lot of 
construction activity and tree harvesting that that would have simply been delayed; a 
sizable proportion of the loss would never be made up. Examples of lost income and 
output that is probably gone forever would include the lost revenue associated with 
tourists and the loss and damage to agriculture (grapes, timber, livestock, feed and 
crops). 
As regards the medium term, we estimate that the effects of the bushfires on output 
levels were as follows: 
• 25 % reductions in output levels in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing in all four 
Shires, 
• 25 % reductions in output levels in Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants in all 
four Shires, and 
• 25 % reductions in output levels in Cultural and Recreation Services in all four 
Shires. 
The next step was to add both the short term and medium term effects of the bushfires 
together to obtain the total effects. 
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Table 3 All Shires.   
ESTIMATED TOTAL EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million).  
  GShP Effect 
Alpine LGA $1,066.6 -$48.8 
East Gippsland LGA $1,021.2 -$40.9 
Indigo LGA $514.7 -$19.6 
Towong LGA $203.8 -$11.7 
      
TOTAL $2,806.3 -$121.1
Table 3 shows Total Effects and tells us that our estimate of the total effect of the 
bushfires on the level of economic activity for the period when the threat arose (some 
time in January) until the present (the end of May), across the Shires of Alpine, East 
Gippsland, Indigo and Towong is lost production and income of $121.1 million.  
The key points about this lost output are that: 
• It would also have further spillover effects to other industries, both within the 
Shires examined in this study and in other industries right across Australia. An 
estimate of this additional spillover loss to other industries goes beyond the 
scope of the present study, as it would require more complicated economic 
modelling. 
• The negative effects of the bushfires are likely to be felt for some time into the 
future. But as we have not developed a forecasting model we have not attempted 
to quantify any effects that go beyond the present. 
• This figure does not include any of the damage or loss to infrastructure, property 
and the natural environment. Fire damage to infrastructure is only relevant in so 
far as it affects GShP. Nor does our total economic effects figure include social 
costs (family breakdown, health impacts, social links and so on). 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The RMIT research team has made ten specific recommendations that we believe will 
address the many issues identified in our report. We also believe that if each of these 
recommendations is acted upon in good time, and in good faith, it will go a long way to 
reduce the social and economic impact of bushfires in Victoria in the future. 
 
The RMIT research team recommends that: 
 
1. An immediate study be undertaken into the financial viability of local businesses 
ravaged by the fires, including the development of strategies to rejuvenate the 
local farming economies and/or to cushion the effects of local economic 
restructuring as a result of the bushfires on those communities, businesses and 
landowners affected. 
 
2. A review of the organisation, coordination and recovery processes associated 
with fighting bushfires be carried out. 
 
3. A study of the capacity of the community to simultaneously fight fires while 
undertaking recovery operations, especially during extended periods of fires, be 
undertaken. 
 
4. The Department of Infrastructure embarks on a complete assessment of the 
impact of the fires on local government infrastructure and facilities in the affected 
areas. 
 
5. The State Government commissions ethnographic research into the social and 
cultural impact of the bushfires such that personal accounts can be presented to 
the wider Victorian community. 
 
6. The State Government commits to research both the short and long-term 
environmental implications of the bushfire. 
 
7. The Department of Sustainability and Environment undertakes research into 
effective bush fire management of public land adjacent to private land. 
 
8. A strategic plan for a collective public policy response in the event of future 
bushfires be developed, and annually revised. 
 
9. A comparative study of firefighting practices and recovery efforts in Victoria and 
Canberra (especially in relation to the resourcing of recovery efforts) be 
undertaken. 
 
10. A follow-up socio-economic study be carried out in twelve months in order to 
document and evaluate steps taken to address the longer-term implications of 
the fires. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Timber Towns Victoria (TTV), a local government association, commissioned a team of 
researchers from RMIT University in May 2003 to undertake an assessment of the socio-
economic impact of the recent bushfires on communities in the North East and 
Gippsland areas of the State1.  This report presents the findings from the study. 
2 BACKGROUND2 
In January and February 2003 the North East of the State of Victoria was engulfed by 
wildfires. Over a million hectares of forests, parks and private land burned. The areas 
most affected by the fires were the North East and Gippsland regions. 
2.1 State Government Responses 
In response, the Victorian Government established a Ministerial Taskforce on Bushfire 
Recovery, whose role it was to assess the impact of the fires and quickly put in place a 
range of recovery measures. The Final Report of the Ministerial Taskforce on Bushfire 
Recovery outlined spending by the Victorian State Government totalling $201 million in 
response to the bushfires. This was made up of a $13.9 million package to provide 
immediate recovery support to fire affected communities, $115 million in fire suppression 
costs, $3 million in financing support for concession loans through the Rural Finance 
Corporation, and other initiatives totalling $69.4 million. These other initiatives in three 
key support areas: financial assistance, social support assistance, and the promotion of 
volunteer input from the wider community. 
2.2 Community Recovery Initiatives 
A number of initiatives have been implemented by the Victorian Government to assist 
affected communities in their recovery from the bushfires. One initiative has been the 
provision of grants, including temporary living expenses and re-establishment grants, 
and utility relief grants. 
Community Recovery Committees (CRCs) have also been established in response to 
the bushfires. These CRCs oversee the recovery process and provide formal means for 
consultation, advice, planning and coordination to assist affected communities. CRCs 
include representatives from local government, State Government, and non-government 
agencies, community groups, businesses and health and welfare agencies. The State 
Government has also established an inter-departmental committee to work with CRCs to 
assist community recovery and to ensure implementation of initiatives.  
The Department of Human Services (DHS) has funded community development officers 
in each of the affected local government areas, and councils are appointing officers for a 
period of 12 months who promote and support local community recovery. Additionally, 
the State Government has established the volunteer register to help people and 
communities affected by fire.  
                                                 
1 The Terms of Reference for this research project, and the related Proposal prepared by the team, are reproduced in 
Appendix 1. 
2 This background information is drawn extensively from Victorian Government (2003) Final Report from the Ministerial 
Taskforce on Bushfire Recovery, Victorian Government (2003), Bushfire Recovery 2003 Information Sheet - Recreational 
Fisheries as well as www.parkweb.vic.gov.au (accessed 30 May 2003). 
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In January of this year the Victorian Government announced the establishment of a 
Bushfire Recovery Appeal Fund, for the collection and distribution of aid for bushfire 
relief. The Appeal Fund is chaired by Sir Gustav Nossal and supported by an 
independent advisory board. Those eligible for assistance include individuals and 
households whose primary place of residence is within bushfire affected areas, small 
businesses and farms located or operating in a bushfire affected area, and communities 
and volunteer organisations seeking to undertake community recovery and rebuilding 
activities. 
Assistance with low-interest loans is available to primary producers and small 
businesses that suffered property loss or damage as a result of the bushfires. These 
concession loans, administered through the Rural Finance Corporation of Victoria, bear 
interest at 4% per annum for an initial period not exceeding five years. In addition to the 
loans, financial assistance is available for replacing lost or damaged structures, 
livestock, fodder and water and personal property. 
2.3 Environmental Recovery Initiatives 
The 2003 bushfires burned 1.1 million hectares of public land in northeast Victoria and 
Gippsland. The fires had a significant impact on Victoria’s State forests, the Alpine, Mt 
Buffalo and Snowy River National Parks, and Mt Hotham and Falls Creek alpine resorts. 
All but 60,000 hectares of the fire occurred on public land. The consequences of such 
extensive fire damage included reduction in water quality and supply, destruction of 
habitat for significant plant and wild life, burned commercial timber stands, destroyed 
recreation, tourism and cultural sites, and affected farms next to public land. 
Much of the land burned by the bushfires is part of the water supply catchments for 
towns in northeast Victoria and east Gippsland. As a consequence of these fires, in the 
short to medium term, river water quality is expected to be affected following significant 
rain, due to the potential for increased overland runoff.  
Up to 9,000km of fire containment lines were constructed during the fire suppression 
efforts, with approximately 7,000km on public land and 1,700km on private land. These 
containment lines are now being progressively rehabilitated to minimize the risk that they 
will lead to soil erosion following rain.  
The assets in 12 State Parks suffered extensive damage during the bushfires. These 
assets include bridges, buildings, camping grounds, car parks, fencing, general facilities, 
furniture, paths, trails and walking tracks, roads, roofed accommodation (including alpine 
huts), shelter, signage, snow poles, toilets, viewing lookouts, and water access 
structures. Assets in forests have also suffered damage including stream crossings, 
gates, signage and visitor facilities such as camping grounds, toilets, car parks, picnic 
areas, walking tracks and shelters. 
In terms of ecological and cultural heritage, much damage was done by the bushfires. 
Medium-term strategies are in place for assisting the recovery of the natural 
environment, as the Victorian Government recognizes that maintaining environmental 
services and biodiversity are fundamental to quality of life and well being. 
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The fires had a major impact on endangered species and habitats. Thirty-two vegetation 
types were affected, with some being totally burned out3. Also, approximately 70 
threatened flora species have had between 90 and 100 per cent of their known Victorian 
distribution affected by the bushfires4, while 8 threatened species have had 90 to 100 
per cent of their known Victorian habitat affected5. The key to longer-term recovery and 
survival of wildlife affected by fires is how vegetation responds and habitats recover. 
Some human intervention is required to facilitate or speed recovery processes.  
In terms of cultural impacts, the fires affected approximately 270-recorded non-
indigenous archaeological sites. These sites are associated with early European 
exploration, mining, settlement, pastoral, survey and recreational activities and are 
significant tourism and recreational attractions. Recovery action required involves the 
restoration and protection of non-indigenous cultural heritage assets damaged by fires 
and indigenous sites exposed and made vulnerable by the fires. 
2.4 Economic Recovery Initiatives 
While some businesses experienced an upturn as a direct result of the fire fighting 
efforts, most reported a 50-70 per cent downturn in business, with some cases as high 
as 100 per cent during and immediately after the bushfires. Business operators in the fire 
affected areas experienced an immediate and major reduction in demand for their goods 
and services, especially those reliant on tourism. Communities also suffered non-
recoverable losses resulting from the cancellation of planned events, such as fishing 
contests, music festivals, expositions and shows, and sporting events.  
It is believed that longer-term economic recovery is dependent on infrastructure repairs 
to roads and bridges, agricultural recovery, environmental recovery and the return of 
tourists6. 
In terms of tourism, the bushfires affected more than 1,100 tourism businesses in the 
northeast and East Gippsland. The fires struck at what would have been the busiest time 
of the year. Recovery action to boost tourism includes the State Government’s $2 million 
Tourism Bushfire Recovery Plan.  
Damage to private land resulting from the bushfires was limited to 60,000 hectares, with 
26 houses and 364 farms affected. Over 11,000 head of livestock perished in the 
bushfires, made up of 7,800 sheep, 3,119 cattle and 184 other stock. Farming 
communities require assistance for stock loss, destroyed feed, damaged pastures, 
damaged fences, and the rehabilitation of fire control lines. To help support the farming 
community, the State Government will deliver a package of $8.6 million in assistance. 
Approximately 1,500km of Crown boundary fencing was destroyed or damaged by the 
fires. The State Government has announced a fencing relief package to enable the safe 
management and feeding of livestock and reduce the potential for soil erosion on areas 
with reduced vegetation cover due to fire.  
                                                 
3 Final Report From The Ministerial Taskforce, pg 8. 
4Ibid 
5 Ibid 
6 Interim Report From The Ministerial Taskforce On Bushfire Recovery, pg 17 
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In total, 4,435km of roadway was affected by the bushfires, including 11 arterial roads 
covering 870 kilometres and 4 bridges. It was imperative that these roads were 
reopened quickly to assist the economic recovery. All affected roads were reopened by 
the first week of March. The scope of damage to roads included destroyed or damaged 
roadside furniture, including 600 signs, 11,000 guideposts, and 5,800 meters of 
guardrails to be replaced, 40km of damaged line marking to be replaced, 13,000 burned 
trees, 19 damaged bridges with structural and safety hazards, and unstable roadside 
embankments resulting from burned out vegetation support. 
The Bushfires are expected to have adverse impacts on fish populations in streams and 
lakes, due to the effects of the fires on water quality. The Department of Primary Industry 
has established a two-year Recreational Fisheries Bushfire Recovery Program to 
maintain fishing for local anglers and tourists in fire-affected areas. Also, a Fire Recovery 
Liaison Group has been established that aims to ensure ‘recreational fishing and tourism 
interests are taken into account as recovery programs are developed and implemented.’7 
3 STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Our study approach reflected the need to provide a measured response to the socio-
economic impact of the fires within a relatively short time frame and a limited budget, to 
ensure that TTV have credible information with which to support their discussions with 
the Victorian and Federal governments. It combined a series of methods and sources of 
data, including a literature review (government and shire reports and statistics, articles, 
and papers); face-to-face and telephone interviews with people in a sample of local 
government areas affected in some way by the fires; focus group/ group interviews with 
key stakeholders; and discussions with government agencies. 
This combination of methods helped the consultants strengthen the results by 
overcoming charges of personal bias and any significant gaps that might occur given the 
short timelines of the study. Our approach also overcame the possible weakness of 
relying on one method and any personal biases stemming from a single method (Denzin, 
1989; Glesne and Peshkin, 1992).  
Following discussions with the clients we focused on the short and medium term socio-
economic impact of the fires in East Gippsland and in the North East region. The North 
East region includes the Indigo, Alpine and Towong Shire Councils. These were areas 
that were known to have been affected directly and indirectly by the fires. It was 
important to understand the short and medium term effects of the fires of those 
communities directly impacted as well as adjoining communities, and as those further 
removed from the bushfire areas. The consultants visited all identified shires 
The business questionnaire, together with a covering letter from Councillor Malcolm 
Hole, President of TTV, was distributed by post, facsimile, email, and by hand during the 
consultants’ visits to the shires. It was designed to quantify, as far as practicable, the 
financial effects of the fires and included questions about the impact on business 
earnings, customers, timing of effects, employee numbers, prices, insurance, 
involvement in fighting the fires, medical costs, and government assistance.  The social 
impact questionnaire was relatively short and aimed to gather some quantitative 
measures. However, given the tight timeframe for their completion and the consequent 
                                                 
7 Victorian Government, Bushfire Recover 2003 Community Information Sheet – Recreational Fisheries 
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poor response rate, the data gained has only been useful in helping support our 
interview findings. The distributed surveys can be found in Appendix 4, while a selection 
of the responses is in Appendix 5. 
Although we endeavoured to survey bushfire-affected businesses, we were not very 
successful in obtaining large numbers of completed business surveys. This can be 
explained as we had limited time and resources to distribute surveys and to follow them 
up, and it appears that many people in the bushfire-affected areas had cooperated with 
a number of previous inquiries (including completing earlier surveys). This made them 
less inclined to return another survey. 
Nevertheless, there was a lot of useful information in many of the surveys that were 
returned, and here is a brief summary of some information gleaned from a selection of 
the returned surveys presented in Appendix 5. 
Almost all respondents in retail and tourism reported: 
• 90 to 100 % reduction in short term business 
• 20 to 50 % reduction in medium term business 
• reduced employee numbers 
• they generally provided some free and reduced priced products to people 
effected by the fires (including fire fighters) 
• most employees spent time away from work fighting bush fires. 
Timber industry respondents reported: 
• 80 to 100 % reduction in short term business 
• increases in medium term business (trying to catch up on lost business) 
A winery reported: 
• similar short and medium term loss of business as was the case in other 
categories 
• in addition to these losses they suffered smoke damage to grapes worth many 
thousands of dollars, which was not covered by insurance. 
When all of these factors were taken into account in our economic model all four Shires 
combined, we estimated that the effect of the bushfires on the level of economic activity 
for the period when the threat arose (some time in January) until the present (the end of 
May), we estimate a loss of production and income of $121.1 million. Refer to section 6 
for details. 
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4 NORTH EAST REGION 
4.1 Profile of the region 
The North East Region encompasses Indigo, Alpine and Towong Shires. The total 
population of the North East Region is approximately 38,000 people.  This includes a 
Labour Force of around 17,000.  The major industry sectors across the region in which 
people mainly find employment are: 
• Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
• Manufacturing 
• Retail Trade 
• Health and Community Services 
• Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 
• Property and Business Services 
• Education8 
This section of the Report provides assessments for each of the Shires in the North East 
Region. 
4.2 Indigo Shire 
Indigo Shire is located 270 km north-east of Melbourne and covers 2,016 sq. km.  It has 
a population of 14, 536 people.  Its industry is essentially rural.  The shire economy is 
built around farming (beef, sheep, dairy, fruit and viticulture), processing of local primary 
produce and service industries, especially tourism.  The major tourist attractions 
associated with Indigo Shire include the Rutherglen wine region and the historic towns of 
Beechworth, Chiltern and Yackendandah.  These townships usually attract thousands of 
visitors each year.9 
4.2.1 Focus Group Consultations 
Focus Group discussions were held in Indigo Shire on 19 May 2003.  The researcher (Dr 
Scott Phillips, RMIT) met with representatives of local volunteer-based emergency 
service organisations as well as local farmers and business people.  
Immediate Impacts of the Fires 
People from Yackandandah said that the biggest thing was sleepless nights.  Since the 
fires people talk bout experiencing a sense of anxiety whenever they hear fire sirens. 
                                                 
8 The industry sector terminology used throughout this report draws upon the industry classifications used in the ABS 
1996 Census of Population and Housing. 
9 Indigo Shire Council (7 May 2003), Submission to the Federal Inquiry Into Victorian Bushfires 2003: Final Copy: 2 ('Shire 
at a Glance') 
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Businesses generally in Yackandandah were not affected significantly.  The motel lost 
some income as a result of cancelled bookings for the long weekend following the fires, 
but the motel owner noted that trade had picked up by May.  ‘The media have done their 
job quite well’, one person noted in this regard.  She suggested that stories about 
Yackandandah on TV programs such as Discover had encouraged people to come back 
to Yackandandah as tourists.  Tourism advertisements were run free of charge in local 
and regional newspapers also.  
Similarly, Beechworth was described as having been like a ghost town immediately 
following the fires.  At the time of the fires and for the weeks immediately following them, 
businesses were shut.  There was too much smoke; there was nothing much to see; and 
inaccurate radio reports of the state of Beechworth itself suggested to tourists that it was 
best avoided.  Again, positive media reports since then have helped to improve the 
situation. But there still appears to be some slowness in Beechworth’s business activity.  
One local said she was sick of the ‘constant grizzles’ of tourism and business operators, 
who complain about the fall of in their business since the fires. 
Farmers also have been affected.  A farmer from the Chiltern area observed that farmers 
lost hay as a result of the fires, but that most properties were saved.  This farmer has his 
property next to a National Park (under the management of Parks Victoria through the 
Department of Sustainability and the Environment – or DSE).  Whilst the fire did not 
damage his property, he observed that ‘it was all very scary’. A change in the direction of 
the wind could have meant that his farm might have been devastated. 
This farmer also commented on the impact of the fires on tourism to Chiltern.  Tourism to 
his local town, he said, ‘stopped for weeks.’ As he put it: ‘It’s as if someone had built a 
fence across the roads leading to Chiltern.  All tourism stopped.’ He noted that local 
tourism had started to show signs of recovery around Easter.  
This farmer is a registered CFA volunteer, and in that capacity he helped to fight fires in 
the region.  He described the efforts of the local CFA as well organized, saying that they 
‘did a wonderful job.’  His description of the fire fighting effort, and the problems 
associated with it as a result of the involvement of professionals from Melbourne, 
stimulated a lot of discussion about the medium to long term social impact of the fires. 
Medium term impacts of the fires 
One of the themes to emerge from people’s description of the fire fighting effort is a 
conflict between a ‘roll up your sleeves’ spirit of volunteerism (associated with country 
people generally) and a risk averse, ‘by the book’ spirit of professional fire management 
(associated with public servants and CFA professionals from Melbourne). 
Red Cross volunteers observed that locals who were not registered CFA volunteers 
were not accepted for fire fighting duty ‘because of the red tape of insurance and the 
like’. While some people associated this ‘red tape’ approach with the professionals who 
came in from Melbourne after the first few days of fire fighting ‘to take charge of things’, 
the St John’s Ambulance and CFA representatives noted that guidelines for the use of 
volunteers had been developed by the CFA following the Coronial Inquiry into the Linton 
bushfires of 2000, where untrained volunteers had lost their lives.  Now it is mandatory 
that every CFA volunteer undertake Minimal Skills training in order to be a registered 
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CFA volunteer.  So, when the fires broke out in January this year, anyone who had not 
done the Minimal Skills training was not allowed to join the fire fighting effort.   
The CFA informants observed that ‘the whole community pulled together so strongly’ to 
fight the fires.  Local businesses provided chocolates and sustenance for the fire-
fighters. Local people – Red Cross and everyday residents – brought in scones and 
cakes to the central Incident Control Centres – so much so that the CFA had to ask them 
to stop. Here too the community touched on another sore point – namely, that people’s 
volunteer efforts to provide food for fire-fighters were not properly appreciated – partly 
because of concerns about the hygiene standards associated with donated food.  The 
‘Melbourne people’ expressed concerns that unhygienic food could cause illness or 
death.  ‘The same sort of sandwiches didn’t kill you twenty years ago, so what’s changed 
now?’, one local woman remarked. 
The Red Cross seems to have had their sense of value undermined by their recent 
experiences with the management of the fire fighting effort.  Red Cross is the recognized 
agency to supply catering for the CFA and volunteers more generally during a prolonged 
emergency.  This arrangement with the CFA ‘worked well to a point this time’, according 
to one Red Cross volunteer.  She noted that the Red Cross was proving hundreds of 
sandwiches each day, but as more professionals from CFA, DSE and Parks Victoria 
became involved with the management of the fire fighting, the demand for cooked meals 
got beyond 500 per day.  At that point the meal preparation function was outsourced by 
the DSE and Parks Victoria managers to the kitchens of nearby La Trobe University.  
Red Cross volunteers expressed their view that this arrangement should have been 
cleared through Red Cross Headquarters in Melbourne, so that the local Red Cross 
volunteers could have been advised by their own organization of the new arrangement.  
In the emergency context, however, DSE and Parks Victoria circumvented the usual 
communications protocols with Red Cross and outsourced the function directly.   
But it is not the Red Cross alone who feel that their volunteer efforts have been 
undermined by the intrusion of professionals from Melbourne.  Local CFA volunteers 
also felt that their role and their local knowledge of fire fighting were undervalued and 
frustrated by ‘Melbourne people’. When asked who these people were, one local 
volunteer explained that they were paid CFA staff and CFA volunteers from Melbourne. 
A long-standing local CFA Communications Officer recalled the first few days of the fire.  
He and his local CFA colleagues worked through the afternoon when the fire broke out 
and into the night.  ‘It was when we were relieved that things went pear-shaped.’, he 
explained. He described how ‘the Melbourne people’ came in and took control of the 
Incident Control Centre.  They installed sophisticated communications and computing 
equipment and assumed operational control for directing fire-fighting efforts of local CFA 
brigades.  Thereafter, according to local people, they would not release control, would 
not consult with locals about how best to get to a fire site and would not eat locally-
prepared sandwiches (claiming that they required a cooked meal).   
Another local CFA fire-fighter added that this was a ‘fairly typical pattern’ for the whole of 
the North East of Victoria.  That is, the local CFA Communications Officer ran things for 
the first 48 hours; then the Melbourne CFA officers came in and took charge of directing 
local fire fighting efforts without recourse to local knowledge. This is when things went 
wrong.  This reference to local knowledge was constantly contrasted with the perceived 
relative ignorance of Melbourne people regarding local fire fighting strategies.  
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‘We call them “Flatlanders”’, one local said of the Melbourne people. ‘They have 
never seen a hill in their lives and do not understand hill fires.  They have fought 
grass fires, but they don’t know how to fight hill fires.’ 
When locals say that things went wrong once Melbourne people became involved they 
seem to refer to operational confusions associated with factors like Melbourne CFA 
officers not knowing the quickest local route to a fire site or being confused about 
whether to call out a fire crew or not to properties under possible threat (and leaving 
local fire crews in an ‘on again/off again’ mode of operation). 
CFA volunteers say they were frustrated by not being allowed to access the fire front 
because the Incident Control Centres were not seeking local input on where the 
brigades could best be utilized.  Similarly, one Yackandandah local estimated that at one 
time about a dozen fire trucks were lined up in Yackandandah, unable to get to the water 
pumps and out to the fire front.  She claimed that the hold up was because the fire 
brigades had to fill in a lot of paperwork before they could get out to the fire front.  
There is a sense, then, that ‘Melbourne people’ got in the way of locals’ ability to fight 
fires in the hills they know best. As a result there was a loss in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of local fire fighting efforts.  Politicians from Melbourne also were lumped 
into this nuisance category.  People joked that politicians had to be shown around so 
they could get a photo opportunity for the news.  Once this had been done, the 
politicians would leave the area and the locals could get back to the task of fire fighting. 
But it is not all bad news for the efforts of those who were associated with the work of the 
Incident Control Centres.  When asked why the Indigo Shire had suffered only minimal 
property loss and no loss of life as a result of the fires, people referred to good luck and 
volunteers ‘flogging their guts out’. But they also noted that the Incident Control Centres 
had done a great job.  These had been set up by local volunteers and State public 
servants within two days of the fires breaking out, and they did excellent work in 
preparing maps of the fire spotting and growing fire fronts.  Melbourne-based public 
officials and CFA officers were also praised for their work in planning to meet the 
logistical support requirements of fire-fighters (for such items as bedding, tents and relief 
teams). Where their performance was rated as poor was in the area of communications 
with the actual fire strike teams.  And here the same issue of not utilizing local 
knowledge –especially that of local communications officers - was seen as the major 
shortcoming.  As regards the actual work of the ICCs’ operations, briefings and 
management meetings, people spoke very highly of the way these were managed. 
The economic impact on CFA volunteers was identified as an issue.  The local CFA 
officer for the Kiewa region explained that CFA volunteers were away from their 
businesses for 29 days straight.  Most employees got paid by their employers, and so 
suffered no loss of income.  Farmers, on the other hand, did incur costs, as they had to 
employ casual milkers to keep their dairy farms operational.  Some people avoided these 
costs where wives, children and neighbours were able to pick up the load. 
The economic impact on tourism does not seem to have been significant in the medium 
to long term.  By Easter and thereafter tourism numbers had begun to pick up again. 
Tourists were encouraged by media reports about the regeneration of the environment.  
In nearby Mount Beauty and Bright, for example, tourists advised local tourism operators 
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that they intend to return to these locations every six months, in order to keep a 
progressive photo-record of the regeneration of the trees and hillsides. 
But the pick up in tourism appears to be patchy.  Some businesses, particularly motel 
owners and coach tour operators, experienced a 100% loss of income for several weeks 
after the fires.  And even now there are ongoing losses associated with the fall off in 
coach tours and motel bookings.  The North East Gardens bus tours out of Sydney, for 
instance, were cancelled because Sydney-siders thought the gardens in farms and local 
homes would have been burned out.  This was a misperception of the situation, 
promoted by media misrepresentation of the fire damage.   
In other instances the damage was real and had just as significant consequences.  One 
local berry farm in the area had a vigorous business, but the fruit was affected by smoke 
from the fires and so was not fit for harvesting.  Consequently, fruit pickers were not 
needed, the annual harvest was lost, and the tourism trade associated with ‘pick your 
own’ visits from Melbourne and Sydney did not eventuate.  The business is now for sale.   
Local people say it is hard to put a monetary figure on the loss of income associated with 
foregone custom – especially in the area of tourism.  Similarly, it is hard to quantify how 
much income relief has been lost because businesses have not submitted applications 
for financial assistance.  People explain that local farmers and business people often 
express an ‘it’s just one of those things’ attitude, when they talk about financial loss from 
bushfires.  The attitude is ‘you just wear it’.  The example was cited of two cabinet 
makers who rotated on CFA shifts, lost income, but did not submit claims for financial 
compensation.  As a result of attitudes like this, people have not recovered the losses 
associated with the fires.   
A further cost that is hard to measure is the hidden health cost associated with 
respiratory ailments that people suffered at the time of the fires and for some time 
afterwards. People also report ongoing mental health consequences, including 
depression and anxiety. 
Another medium term impact of the fires is that people are re-thinking the way that local 
knowledge about fire prevention and fire fighting could be disseminated before the next 
fire occurs.  And here people point to a social distinction that underlies their local social 
organisation.  When asked how their local knowledge might be communicated, people 
explained that it would be not so much for the benefit of ‘mainstream farmers’ as it would 
be for ‘lifestyle farmers’.   
‘Mainstream farmers’ are described as local farmers who operate farms as going 
concerns. They are seen as being well prepared for bushfires, and it is estimated that 
nine out of ten of them would be members of a CFA brigade.  ‘Lifestyle farmers’, on the 
other hand, are described as people who are retired from Melbourne or who have 
weekend hobby farms.  These ‘lifestylers’ typically lack knowledge of bushfire 
prevention.  In fact, as they want to live ‘in a bush setting’, they tend not to clear their 
small holdings of combustible scrub and dead wood.  In the focus group discussions it 
was estimated that only about two in ten of the ‘lifestyle farmers’ would belong to CFA 
brigades. But locals put the view that ‘lifestyle farmers’ would be more interested in 
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bushfire preparedness since the recent fires. People believed that it would be timely, 
therefore, to update the CFA’s Living in the Bush: Bushfire Survival Plan Workbook.10 
People expressed concern about the way the media misrepresented the fires.  
Sensationalist reportage not only deterred tourists.  It also produced a sense of panic 
among locals, many of whom relied on radio and TV accounts for knowledge of how the 
fires were progressing. And it was local government infrastructure that was seen as a 
key mechanism for countering this sense of panic.  One person noted that the general 
community was sitting at home in panic as a result of media reportage.  ‘People attended 
shire meetings, hungry for information’, she remarked.  Another local commented that 
people were not sleeping and were stuck at home in panic.  She said that it was only at 
shire meetings that people got a sense of who could provide support.  At the local 
meetings they also benefited from sharing company with each other. 
People associated with volunteer organisations noted some positive outcomes from the 
fires.  The image of the Red Cross had improved considerably as a result of the work 
they had done for the community in a time of great emergency.  The Beechworth Branch 
had won 12 new members since the fires.  The Chiltern Branch had registered 10 new 
members. St John’s Ambulance similarly experienced some modest growth in their 
membership since the fires. 
The focus group discussion closed with people offering a number of recommendations 
for future responses to bushfires. The CFA representatives recommended that during 
any future fire incident, media representatives should liaise with the CFA and DSE for 
information.  This might avoid a situation where the media produce sensationalist 
accounts of the fires, which could help to mitigate the sense of panic people commonly 
experienced.  CFA volunteers noted that they are well trained in offering advice to the 
public via media outlets.  They have a standard message: residents should have a fire 
plan in place; if they are going to leave their property, they should plan to leave early; 
and so on.   
People also saw a role for the media in the form of social marketing – that is, accurate 
information on bushfires could be presented as part of a campaign on bushfire 
prevention and preparedness.  
As regards recovery of the tourism economy, people mentioned that Tourism Victoria is 
working with the Indigo Tourism Board to develop positive media images of the recovery 
and regeneration of the region. 
4.2.2 Public Meeting on Bushfire Recovery 
At the invitation of Mayor of Indigo Shire the researcher also participated in a public 
meeting in Wooragee (on the road between Beechworth and Yackandandah) in the 
evening of 19 May.  It was attended by Shire Councillors as well as local government 
officials and some local farmers. These included: 
                                                 
10 Copies of this publication, printed in 1997, were available free of charge at the Indigo Shire Office. 
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Council perspectives 
Before the meeting began, one councillor welcomed the chance to speak with the 
researcher about the impact of the fires on the Shire.  He said that people’s lives had 
been dislocated.  Fencing replacement is an issue, in that the cost of fence replacement 
on Crown land has to be borne by farmers.  No government assistance is available.  
More generally, although people had not lost their homes, they had suffered economic 
and psychological loss as a result of the fires.  He cited the case of one farming couple 
in their 80s.  They had lost all their hay, a significant number of their livestock and had 
some damage to their farm property – particularly their fencing.  They had told him that 
they found it difficult to rebuild at their age, but felt they had to, as the farm is their home.  
He suggested there are many cases like this.  
Public Forums, organized by the Shire Council, were important occasions when people 
could express their concerns and issues following the fires.  One councillor noted that 
there had been a Public Forum at Wooragee already (on 29 April).  He added that a lot 
of local people had prepared submissions to the State Bushfire Inquiry.  In this respect 
he noted that DSE would hold Bushfire Inquiry public sessions in Beechworth on 10 
June. 
The Public Forum on 19 May (attended by the researchers) began with a presentation 
on Council’s involvement in the fires by the Chief Executive Officer of the Indigo Shire 
Council.  Following three weeks of fire fighting and support activities, the Council has 
entered the fire recovery phase.  In this context, Council has used State Government 
money to employ two part-time Community Development Officers, to help individuals 
with issues.  These officers and the Manager of Community Services have helped to 
secure financial assistance for local people from State and Federal sources.   The 
Council has been involved in co-ordinating regional recovery meetings.  The Council has 
mainly focused on lobbying State and Federal governments to provide funding for 
people affected by the fires.  Council has sought assistance for such issues as clearance 
of fence lines (to reduce combustible grasses near fences), replacement of burned 
fencing and the purchase of water for stock.  Finally, the Council has prepared a 
Submission to the State Government’s Bushfire Inquiry. 
The CEO of Indigo highlighted the following recovery issues: 
• There was a substantial demand for water and fodder immediately following the 
fire.  The Victorian Farmers Federation assisted in sourcing this from all over 
Victoria. 
• A 200% increase in the demand for financial counselling in the last six weeks.  In 
this context, financial counselling concerned issues associated with the fires and 
the drought.  The two issues are seen by most people as inseparable. 
• Reinstatement of fire containment lines has been a priority.  The Council was 
hopeful of having this work completed by the end of the week. In this way, 
farmers could feel secure that their properties were better prepared for any future 
fire outbreak. 
• Effective co-ordination relationships between government agencies are an 
important factor in facilitating recovery initiatives.  The CEO highlighted the good 
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working relationships, which the Indigo Shire Council officials had enjoyed with 
Regional Office staff associated with State and Federal departments and 
agencies.  He cited the example of Centrelink staff working well with North East 
Employment (a local employment agency) to provide workers who could help 
with fencing repairs. On the downside, he bemoaned that he could not get 
anywhere with the State Government in securing their agreement to provide 
financial assistance for fencing repairs on farms which bordered Parks Victoria 
lands. 
• Significant  social service support was being provided to individuals by now 
through the Council.  The CEO expected the demand for this sort of support to 
peak a couple of months after the fires. 
Farmers’ perspectives 
One farmer said that not enough is being done by way of bushfire prevention.  He 
suggested there was an increased amount of land converted into Parks, and as a 
consequence there was insufficient fuel reduction burning being undertaken.   He 
observed that Aborigines had used fire stick techniques to mange fire hazards, but that 
Parks Victoria did not reflect these traditional fire management processes in their 
management of what is effectively a cultural landscape. 
This farmer argued that farmers whose properties abut Park lands are at greater fire risk, 
because Parks Victoria does not undertake sufficient controlled burning to maintain fire 
containment lines. Worse still, from his perspective, is the practice of DSE and the CFA 
lighting a containment fire and standing back while farm fences are burned in the 
process.  The farmer said it is not good enough for these agencies to say that fences are 
insurable assets, when the costs of replacing fences on Crown land are not covered. He 
called on the Indigo Shire Council to make a submission for a better burn-off regime. It 
was his view that the Parks authorities do not seem to understand the need for more 
regular burn offs, so as to reduce combustible fuel near farms and country communities. 
One farmer remarked that the forests managed by Parks Victoria do not look like natural 
forests.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, he said, ‘you could drive at 
speed through the forests’. Today, by comparison, you ‘could not even ride a horse 
through the forests’, which look like ‘a whole lot of broom handles standing close 
together.’ A theme emerging from farmers’ accounts of fire management is that 
Melbourne-based and university-trained policy advisers have dominated the agenda as 
regards burning-off.  They have largely ignored forest lore and local knowledge.  As a 
result, conservationist values have come into conflict with practical farming perspectives 
around the need for fuel reduction. 
A local horticulturalist also complained about the way that the CFA came onto his 
property, bowling over his gate to gain access for the purpose of lighting fires for 
containment lines.  In the event they spoiled his in-ground sprinkler system and did not 
consult with him about the location of the containment line. He called for strategic 
containment lines to be developed on the basis of consultation with property owners. 
Similarly, he argued that designated access gates should be developed, rather than 
continuing with the practice of simply knocking down fences and inadvertently allowing 
stock to wader across neighbouring properties. 
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He proposed that vegetation along roadsides and under power lines should be cleared 
rather than allowing this to become overgrown as ‘wildlife corridors’. His wife said that 
environmental concerns about conservation are overtaking the public safety and fire 
prevention concerns of local ratepayers.  She called on the Shire to be less environment 
oriented and more ratepayer oriented. She and her husband also suggested that farmers 
whose lands abut National Parks should be allowed to clear vegetation and create 
containment lines to protect their fencing – or the Government should pay half of any 
replacement costs incurred by bush fire damage. 
People were ready to make suggestions about how the role of government could be 
improved.  One local resident asked why the Army had not been used to help with 
logistical support.  He suggested that the Army could help to set up mobile camps for the 
fire-fighters, instead of having fire-fighters sleeping in poor quality tents. 
Another suggestion was that the Shire Council could advise people to install water tanks 
with appropriate adaptors, so that CFA fire-fighters from interstate (with differing hose 
connections) could connect their equipment to water sources on local properties. 
One resident noted an anomaly where the Shire could serve fire hazard reduction 
notices on urban ratepayers, but could not do so with rural ratepayers.  This is because 
rural ratepayers are prevented from undertaking fire hazard reduction activities on their 
properties if these breach Parks Victoria conservation guidelines. 
Another farmer, who was a local fire prevention judge with many years experience as a 
CFA brigade leader, observed that not as much fire prevention work is carried out along 
roads and on properties as occurred twenty years ago.  He believed that this is due in 
part to fire-fighters being busy with their other work and family commitments, and in part 
to a decrease in local volunteering for local fire prevention and fire fighting. 
A further suggestion was that Shire Councils need to be vigilant about the ongoing 
effects of natural disasters like fires, drought and hail damage to orchards.  Shires 
should recognize that there will be a need for fodder reserves and recovery assistance 
for between two and five seasons after any immediate crisis.   
One farmer called on the Shire to contact Centrelink, the Department of Primary Industry 
and other Federal authorities, and to lobby them for counselling services (both emotional 
and financial) for farmers who have been affected by bushfires and drought.  
The Mayor concluded the public meeting, noting that following such a one-in-a-hundred-
years fire, the Shire Council needed to put the learnings from the experience into 
practice.  In this way, rural communities in the future should have better prevention 
efforts and readiness plans in place. 
4.2.3 Documentary evidence of responses to the impact of the fires 
The Shire (with assistance from the Department of State and Regional Development) 
has sponsored a travelling show of responses to the January 2003 bushfires. This 
community exhibition is a show of photographs, primary school artworks and written 
material touring communities in Indigo Shire from Woolshed to Indigo Valley.  It is co-
ordinated by the Arts and Cultural Officer at the Indigo Shire Council and will run from 
17th of May to 30th June. 
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The Indigo Shire Council has made written information about Bushfire Recovery 
assistance available via direct mail-out, through public meetings and at literature stands 
in the Shire Office. Literature has included information leaflets about assistance for the 
reinstatement (repair) of containment lines on local farming properties, various forms of 
income support and financial counselling and how to make a submission to the Victorian 
Bushfire Inquiry 2003. 
In the May 2003 edition of the Indigo Informer (the Indigo Shire Council Newsletter) the 
Mayor noted in her ‘Mayoral Thoughts’ column: 
Council and its employees have continued to do a lot of work with regard to 
drought and fire recovery issues. Whilst we have been pleased with the level of 
support from the State Government in general terms, we believe more should be 
done in assisting our farming community on both these issues.  We will keep 
pushing for more drought relief funds and specific fire recovery funding, for 
example, farm fencing.11 
Several local business publications reflected the economic impact of the fires and the 
efforts of local businesses to recover their business positions. The Beechworth Wine 
Centre’s Newsletter, Fine Wine and Rare Antiques (Vol 1, Issue 2, Autumn 2003) 
declared the headline news: ‘Beechworth survives fires unscathed!’ It noted: ‘Now that 
we have survived this period of environmental uncertainty, local businesses are again 
open as usual and many offer special discounts to entice tourists to return to the North 
East of Victoria.’12 
The Albury Wodonga Regional Tourism Forum Inc, an independent, grassroots-driven 
association made up of members with an interest in tourism around the region, 
conducted a survey of its members to gauge the extent of the fire and drought-related 
losses in different industry sectors. The January-February edition of the Forum’s 
Newsletter reported as follows: 
Our thoughts and sympathy go out to our members who are experiencing difficult 
times as a result of the prolonged drought and bush fires.  Some members have 
had no income since the bush fires started in early January. It has now reached a 
crucial stage where we need to be very proactive and help the industry to recover 
the best way we can.13  
Consequently the Forum undertook to survey its members and convene a public meeting 
so people could have a say and propose strategies to ensure ‘a more sustainable future 
for the region.’14 
The Indigo Herald (Friday, 9th May, 2003) publicised information about how to make a 
submission to the Victorian Bushfire Inquiry as well as details concerning the ‘On Fire’ 
travelling show of responses to the fires.  The paper also ran a story on ‘Fire Fighter 
Training at Beechworth’, which promoted the Minimum Skills for Wildfire training course 
which has to be undertaken by Victoria’s 60,000 volunteer fire-fighters by June 2005. 
                                                 
11Indigo Informer, Issue 2/2003:1 
12 Fine Wine and Rare Antiques, Vol 1, Issue 2, Autumn 2003: 1 
13 Albury Wodonga Regional Tourism Forum Inc January – February 2003 Newsletter: 1 
14 ibid. 
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Finally, the tension between the conservation values of the National Park and 
environmentalists, on one hand, and the practical concerns and local knowledge of 
regional farmers and CFA fire-fighters on the other was expressed starkly in an 
anonymous poem, entitled ‘Green Pollies On Fire’, in the El Dorado and District Star (a 
free community newsletter). In this piece the local poet addressed his green opponents 
thus: 
Tell me now where’s your habitat, in the parks that you craved? 
But for your lack of care, the whole lot would be saved, 
Once more rural’s punished, through no fault of their own,  
And where are the greenies, now the birds have flown/ 
 
Where were the greenies with all their ideas, 
At home safe and sound; while we lived our worst fears! 
The locals all told you, but not one of you listened, 
Now your park lays in ashes that the devil has christened.15 
The author goes on to urge politicians to weigh rural concerns with their eagerness to 
secure the environmentalist vote.  In doing so the poem points up one of the major 
themes to emerge from the bush fires: the conflict between environmentalism and rural 
interests.   
4.2.4 Conclusion 
The research for this community impact assessment has revealed a number of emergent 
themes. These are: 
• Businesses were initially severely affected by the bushfires, and have not yet 
recovered. 
• The recovery that has occurred is patchy.  Some businesses have closed, while 
others have recovered to some extent. Overall, businesses in Indigo Shire still 
suffer from the ongoing decline in tourism and from the generally straitened 
circumstances farmers and retailers have faced since the fires. 
• It is difficult to put a monetary value on the losses associated with foregone 
custom – especially in the tourism sector. 
• Farmers suffered economic losses mainly in regard to fencing damage. 
Consequently they are burdened with significant fencing repair costs.  Damage to 
fencing was partly a direct consequence of the fires themselves and partly a 
result of CFA efforts to set containment fires on farms abutting the fire front. 
Farmers have also experienced economic difficulties due to loss of hay and some 
livestock.   
• Volunteers have had their willingness to volunteer in the future partially 
undermined by the intrusion of external professionals who circumvented usual 
communication protocols with volunteer agencies.  Volunteer fire-fighters also felt 
                                                 
15 El Dorado and District Star Issue 94, May 2003: 15 
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that their local knowledge was underutilized in the fire fighting effort when 
Melbourne-based professionals took charge of directing local fire fighting efforts. 
• Despite this perceived slap in the face for local volunteers, the spirit of 
volunteering would seem to have remained healthy.  People report increases in 
membership of the Red Cross and St John’s Ambulance.  And the local 
newspaper reported increases in CFA volunteers since the fires. 
• There is a need for better communication and respect between Melbourne-based 
officials and local fire-fighters and volunteers in the future if fires are to be fought 
more efficiently and effectively. 
• Another medium term impact of the fires is that people are re-thinking the way 
that local knowledge about fire prevention and fire fighting could be disseminated 
before the next fire occurs.   
• Underlying the distinction sometimes made between ‘locals’ and ‘lifestylers’ is a 
cultural clash between practical rural knowledge and urban environmental 
conservationism. It is not so much that one is right and the other is wrong.  It is 
more that a new balance between the two needs to be struck if rural communities 
are to develop a more sustainable future. 
• Local government plays an important role not only in assisting with fire fighting 
but also in co-ordinating the delivery of recovery services.  This includes lobbying 
State and Federal levels of government to secure the resources that farming 
communities need to cope with the ongoing aftermath of fires and droughts for 2 
to 5 seasons after the immediate crisis has passed. 
• And local tourism boards and forums also serve an important function of helping 
regional businesses to assess the extent of their income losses, so as to provide 
advice to governments on the sort of recovery assistance that local businesses 
require. In this way, local business and tourism associations work as effective 
partners with government to help communities in Victoria’s timber towns to 
regenerate and grow again. 
4.2.5 The total economic effect of the bushfire on the Indigo Shire 
When all of these factors were taken into account in our economic model of the region, 
we estimated that the effect of the bushfires on the level of economic activity for the 
period when the threat arose (some time in January) until the present (the end of May), 
across the Shire of Indigo, was a loss of production and income of $19.6 million. Refer to 
section 6 for details. 
4.3 Alpine Shire 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
For more than a month during early 2003 the Alpine Shire in Victoria’s northeast was 
ravaged by bushfires.  Every town and village in the Shire was affected. While the fires 
burned they presented a real threat to the lives of residents and to private and public 
property. The fires also adversely affected economic and social activities within the 
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Shire. These impacts on economic and social activity continue to threaten the viability of 
the towns of Alpine Shire, months after the actual fires themselves. 
The Alpine Shire is approximately 300km northeast of Melbourne and has a resident 
population of almost 13,000 people. About 92% of the Shire’s area of 4,837 square 
kilometres is public land, including significant sections of the Alpine National Park, as 
well as the Mt Buffalo National Park. The region contains three of Victoria’s snow resorts 
– Mt Hotham/Dinner Plain, Falls Creek, and Mt Buffalo. The major towns within the Shire 
are Bright, Myrtleford, Mt Beauty and Dinner Plain. Other towns within the Shire include: 
Boogong, Buckland, Buffalo Creek, Coral Bank, Dandongadale, Dederang, Eurobin, 
Freeburgh, Germantown, Harrietville, Lake Buffalo, Mt Buffalo, Mudgegonga, Nug Nug, 
Ovens, Porepunkah, Rosewhite, Smoko, Tawonga, Tawonga South, Wandiligong. 
4.3.2 Economic Impact of the Bushfires 
Tourism, timber and agriculture are the traditional economic drivers of the region. 
The bushfires, in terms of smoke and flames, threats to public safety and mass 
withdrawal of visitors haves severely affected economic activity within the Shire. Tourism 
revenues have been greatly reduced as the number of visitors has fallen off dramatically. 
In turn, the flow-on effects to other businesses that are indirectly related to tourism have 
been significant and have ‘clearly demonstrated the critical contribution that the tourism 
industry makes to the regional economy.’16 
Additionally, it has been reported that significant impacts have been felt by the 
agricultural and construction sectors of the Alpine Shire Economy. For instance, in the 
case of the construction industry, a great deal of work had to be postponed during the 
fires because of the inability of construction workers to access worksites, particularly at 
alpine resorts. It has been reported that projects on the mountains are now running 40 
days behind schedule. The agricultural sector is busy repairing damage to property, 
assessing reductions in available water, and addressing stock health and fodder issues. 
The fires particularly affected the wine industry. Smoke-taint, where smoke from the 
bushfires permeated through the skin of grapes, rendering the grapes useless, has 
meant that losses of between $10,000 and $1 million17 are being faced by wine growers 
in the region. The combined estimated loss for Alpine Shire wine growers is between $5 
and $8 million18. 
That the fires had a significant effect on the Shire is obvious. The following quote in 
regards to the fires highlights this: ‘This is the single greatest threat our region has ever 
faced to its economy and social fabric.’19 
4.3.3 Effects on Tourism 
The Alpine Shire is a popular visitor destination and a leader in regional tourism. It 
attracts over 2 million visitors per annum. The Shire is one of natural beauty and 
spectacular scenery, with a broad range of adventure and nature-based activities, as 
                                                 
16 Alpine Shire, 2003 Bushfire Economic Recovery Strategy pg 3 
17 Wine grower, Bushfire Recovery Appeal Fund Trust Board meeting, Alpine Shire, 22/05/03  
18 Ibid 
19 Alpine Shire, 2003 Bushfire Economic recovery Strategy, pg 3 
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well as food and wine attractions. It also has a diverse range of accommodation options 
to suit all budgets and tastes. There are many restaurants, wineries, cafes and galleries, 
while, in terms of adventure tourism, there is bushwalking, mountain bike riding, horse 
riding, hang-gliding, abseiling, microflights, hovercraft rides, caving and rafting. 
4.3.4 Effects on Agriculture and Timber Industries 
At the time of the bushfires the agricultural and timber industries of Alpine Shire were 
dealing with the adverse effects of two major events. First, the closure of the Mt Beauty 
Timber mill in December 2002 resulted in the loss of more than 180 direct and indirect 
jobs in the Shire, and more than $18.5 million from the local economy20. The timber 
industry source who responded to the surveys stated that ‘The engagement of all log 
harvesting contractors in fire suppression for many weeks at the height of this season 
severely depleted log stocks which will not be replenished by winter. This has caused 
and will continue to cause major disruption to my business.’ He also went on to say, 
‘Salvage (logging) operations have been slow to start and a large volume of salvage 
resources will be lost.’ 
The second adverse event in the Shire occurred on 26 November  2002, when a 
devastating hail storm hit the north-east.  This wiped out 84% of the Shire’s apple 
production, costing the Shire more than $20 million and the loss of as many as 1,100 
jobs21. 
4.3.5 Major Economic Issues 
In the report ‘Alpine Shire 2003 Bushfire Economic Recovery Strategy’, prepared by the 
Alpine Shire Council in consultation with the Alpine Shire community, a number of key 
economic issues and impacts arising from the bushfires are addressed. Over a three-
year period the Shire intends to undertake the following: 
• address the immediate issues restricting the economic recovery of the Shire 
• provide immediate and longer-term opportunities to stimulate economic activity, 
with a particular focus on creating new job opportunities and reinstating those 
jobs lost during the crisis 
• maintain and build economic confidence in the Shire, with a particular focus on 
ensuring the progression of a range of multi-million dollar private investment 
projects already approved by Council’s planning division 
• provide an adequate level of support to business operators across all sectors of 
the local economy to facilitate their recovery from income and property losses 
sustained during and in the aftermath of the fires 
• facilitate the implementation of initiatives that provide medium-term opportunities 
for the region to re-establish its position as a prime visitor destination, and one 
that provides excellent lifestyle and employment opportunities for new residents 
                                                 
20 Alpine Shire, 2003 Bushfire Economic Recovery Strategy, pg 5 
21 Ibid 
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• ensure that all infrastructure, particularly that which supports the nature based 
product and its accessibility, is reinstated and enhanced 
• facilitate the further development of existing and potential publicly owned tourism 
product 
• support the broader community in its endeavours to contribute to the economic 
recovery of the region 
• ensure that water quality and supply issues are considered and addressed 
Further key points include: 
• Business Operators 
- Income losses arising from a cessation of visitor activity and its flow on 
impacts, 
- Potential closure of the few remaining adventure businesses that may 
arise from any ‘loss of license’ to access the parks, and the agricultural 
sectors loss of access to high country grazing, 
- Psychological and physical health of business operators across all 
sectors 
• Job Losses 
- Decrease in economic activity has resulted in severe reduction in full-time 
and part-time positions, resulting in significant unemployment 
• Image/Perceptions 
  - Visitor perception in relation to 
   - The scale of damage to the region’s ‘product offer’, 
   - The Alpine High Country being a ‘safe place’ to visit, 
  - Investor perceptions of the region and the opportunities it presents 
• Infrastructure/Product Offer 
- Infrastructure damage to key tracks and trails within the Alpine and Mt 
Buffalo National Parks, which will restrict visitor access and therefore 
significantly reduce nature-based product offer, 
- General infrastructure damage to roads, bridges, signage, etc, and the 
ongoing impact of fire damage to surrounding environments e.g. slope 
stability in mountainous areas, 
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- Reinstatement of damaged vegetation on key Crown land areas and 
National Parks, 
- Infrastructure damage to tracks and trails on Crown land that are used for 
specific sporting events and nature-based activities 
• Events and Festivals 
- Non-recoverable losses experienced by not-for-profit event and festival 
organizers arising from cancelled events planned during the fire period] 
• Property Losses 
- Potential damage to crops, orchards, groves or grazing land and stock 
losses, 
- Damage to private assets, including homes, sheds, yards, fencing, 
machinery, etc, in particular boundary fencing between Crown land and 
private property 
• Water 
- Water quality–short and medium-term, and the flow-on impacts of poor     
water quality on the economy, 
-  Utilisation of water from storage catchments (including farm dams) and 
natural river systems for fire fighting, reducing already limited supplies 
resulting from drought conditions 
4.3.6 Shire Economic Surveys 
In order to explicitly measure the economic impacts of the bushfires on the Alpine 
community, the Alpine Shire Council conducted a survey of businesses. Of 542 
businesses on their database, the Shire surveyed 17722. 
Of the 177 businesses surveyed the results were as follows: 
• For the short-term January/February period: 
 - 40 reported no decline in anticipated income 
 - 42 reported an anticipated decline of 45% 
 - 18 reported a decline in income but did not specify a $ or % value 
- 77 reported an average income decline of $14,800 
• For the medium-term Autumn period: 
 - 25 anticipated no change in income 
 - 8 anticipated a decline in income but did not specify a $ or % value 
 - 41 anticipated an average decline of $12,800 
 - 28 anticipated a reduction of up to 50% in bookings/income 
                                                 
22 Alpine Shire Council, 2003 Bushfire Economic Recovery Strategy, pg 8 
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• Short-term reductions in employment for the January/February period were as 
follows: 
  - 19 firms had reduced the number of full-time staff by an average of 3 
  - 46 had reduced the number of part-time staff by an average of 3.5 
• Medium-term reductions in employment were as follows: 
- 15 reported medium term reductions in full-time and part-time staff of an 
average of 2.3 
Using the data collected from the 177 firms the following assumptions were made: 
• 423 anticipate average losses of $15,000 for the short-term January/February 
period = $6,345,000 
• 184 anticipate average losses of $13,000 each for the medium-term Autumn 
period = $2,392,000 
• 47 have reduced full-time staff for the January/February period of an average of 3 
staff = 141 jobs 
• 101 have reduced part-time staff for the January/February period by an average 
of 3.5 = 354 jobs 
• 38 anticipate medium-term reductions of 2.3 full-time and part-time staff = 87 jobs 
Accordingly, the Alpine Shire Council conservatively estimates that the impact of the 
bushfires is as follows: 
Direct economic impact    $8,737,000 
Indirect economic impact    $13,105,500 
(using a conservative multiplier of 1.5)  $21,842,50023 
 
Temporary reductions in full-time employment 141 jobs 
Temporary reductions in part-time employment 354 jobs 
Medium-term reductions in full-time and part-time 87 
employment 
Multiplier effect of job losses    873 
(using a conservative multiplier of 1.5) 
       1,455 job losses 
 
4.3.7 Social Impact of the Bushfires 
Surveys were distributed by the consultants to members of the Alpine Shire community 
in order to gather information on community opinions and concerns regarding the 
bushfires. From the surveys, and a Bushfire Recovery Appeal Fund Trust Board meeting 
held at the offices of the Alpine Shire Council on Thursday 22nd of May, the major 
concerns of the community were expressed: 
Farmers were concerned that because many have had to sell livestock to pay their bills, 
their income for the current financial year will be boosted which may have implications in 
terms of their access to government grants.  
There was concern expressed about equating the value of property damaged and the 
dollar value that will be received from insurance companies in payouts. For instance, one 
farmer stated that some individual losses are as high as $160,000, but nowhere near 
would this amount be paid out by insurance companies 
                                                 
23 Businesses operating exclusively in the Alpine resorts of Falls Creek and Mt Hotham were not surveyed 
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A concern of some is whether the funds and grants received from government will be 
regarded as taxable income  
A major concern for farmers is the issue of fencing that borders national parks. Farmers 
are concerned that the fencing is not insured because of the fact that much of the fire 
that burned fences was deliberately lit in back burning operations and, hence, is not 
covered by insurance   
Many were concerned with the fact that the media was portraying the notion that the 
entire Shire was burned out and that it was unsafe to be anywhere in the Shire. One 
survey respondent stated “The impression the media gave the general public was that 
the Bright township and surrounds were destroyed”. Another respondent said that the 
Shire was having “difficulty in convincing people that the place is not burned out and that 
it is safe to have a holiday in Bright”.  
Some residents expressed the view that the forms that needed to be filled in to receive 
government grants were confusing and unclear on some points. One respondent made 
the comment that “the process is quite onerous”. Concern was also expressed that 
because of the isolation problems associated with the fires residents could not access 
their local Centrelink offices to claim government funding and that Centrelink would not 
allow for retrospective lodging of forms because it would “set a precedent that couldn’t 
be sustained.”24 Some survey respondents expressed concern that the Federal 
Government was offering little support: “We have applied for Federal Government 
assistance 2 months ago and as yet we haven’t heard from them.” However, one survey 
respondent stated that “The recovery plan instituted by the Alpine Shire and State 
Government was excellent, but misunderstanding of the overall problem took a medium 
time to catch on with the various Government departments.” 
Residents experienced a great deal of stress during the fires. Comments such as “My 
spouse was very disturbed by the stress and worry during the entire six weeks” were 
common. Also, many respondents stated that physical health problems, mental health 
problems, schooling/education problems, isolation problems, and reduced social support 
all resulted from the fires. 
One respondent made the comment that “All fire-fighters should be paid when working 
for the CFA in such a wide scale emergency.” 
4.3.8 The total economic effect of the bushfire on the Alpine Shire 
 
When all of these factors were taken into account in our economic model of the region, 
we estimated that the effect of the bushfires on the level of economic activity for the 
period when the threat arose (some time in January) until the present (the end of May), 
across the Shire of Alpine, was a loss of production and income of $48.8 million. Refer to 
section 6 for details. 
 
                                                 
24 Bushfire Recovery Appeal Fund Trust Board meeting, Alpine Shire, 22/05/03 
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4.4 Towong Shire  
Covering an area of some 6,500 square kilometres, Towong Shire occupies the far north 
eastern “corner” of Victoria.  Of this area, nearly half is public land, much of it state and 
national park. Approximately 6,300 people live in the Shire.  Just over a third (2,300) are 
resident in Corryong and Tallangatta, with the remainder in the smaller communities of 
Mitta Mitta, Dartmouth, Eskdale, Bellbridge, Bethanga, Talgarno, Granya, Walwa, 
Tintaldra, Towong, Cudgewa and Koetong and in the surrounding rural areas. 
It is estimated that 51 % of the total area of the Shire was burned during the 
January/February bushfires, including: 
• State forest and national park (including logging coupes) 
• Private land used for agriculture 
• Pine plantations 
• Associated infrastructure such as fencing, signage, outbuildings 
Every town, village and rural district in the Shire felt the impact of the fires in some way, 
and every business was affected. 
4.4.1 Economic Impacts 
 
People caught up in fighting the fires experienced a direct loss of income.  Most farmers 
spent between 4 and 6 weeks away from their farms fighting fires.  During that time 
many farmers had to employ casual labour to milk their cows and feed their cattle.  
Alternatively, children had to take on farm labouring duties. Local building contractors 
lost between 18 and 35 days through firefighting.  Building supplies companies lost 
income when the builders were away. And some local government workers took up to 
two weeks leave without pay to be at home or to help fight fires. Tourism businesses 
(motels and caravan parks) lost business when the fires took hold, as people holidaying 
in the Shire evacuated the area for safety reasons.  On the other hand, tourism and retail 
businesses received compensatory income from accommodating and feeding firefighting 
staff from out of town. 
 
In the period immediately after the fires, according to the CEO of Towong Shire Council, 
tourism and retail businesses were ‘hammered’.  Tourism dried up as a result of the way 
the area was portrayed by the media, although one tourism operator did state that 
because Towong Shire was generally ignored by the media the negative impacts of the 
bushfires on tourism were mitigated somewhat. Generally though, residents felt that the 
effects of the bushfires were grossly exaggerated by the media who engaged in 
sensationalist reporting. Additionally, State Government tourism-related media 
advertising after the fires ignored the some parts of the Shire, such as Corryong and 
Tallangatta. And retail trade was affected not only by the fall off in tourism but also 
because financially straitened locals were not going to pubs on Saturday nights or 
spending money in the shops. One local business operator described how for the 
duration of the fires (about six weeks) trade in Corryong virtually ceased.  Most of the 
people who normally frequented Corryong’s central business district were away at the 
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fire front.  As virtually no-one came to town, there was, in his estimation, an 80 per cent 
loss of custom during January and most of February. 
 
In the medium term, the local economy has experienced a patchy recovery.  While some 
businesses (especially grocers) have picked up, others in non-essential sectors (such as 
kitchen ware) have found it difficult to recover custom and, in some cases, face closure.  
The local timber industry was also affected. About 150 hectares of softwood plantation 
timber were burned.  And hardwood mills experienced several weeks of lost production, 
although they have since resumed activity. 
 
The greatest financial impacts have been borne by farmers.  Fodder and grain have 
been contaminated by pest infestations. Consequently, some livestock have died from 
food poisoning. Farmers also lost livestock during the fires. This has lead to lost income 
for farmers who could have sold off livestock at saleyards.  Those livestock that did 
survive have lost condition, largely because they have lost protein and have had to be 
feed with dry fodder, which farmers have had to buy in at a cost. This loss of condition 
will affect their future productivity, especially in terms of a reduced capacity for calving. 
Furthermore there were substantial losses of newborn calves in the first eight weeks 
after the fires due to the stress on the cows, in addition to the shock and stress felt by 
working farm animals, such as dogs, which has lead to farmers incurring significantly 
higher veterinary costs. Farmers have also had to bear agistment-related freight costs in 
moving their animals to better pastures. 
Decreased income has meant that some members of farm families have been forced to 
seek alternative employment in order to supplement family income, leading to pressure 
on children, family problems and fatigue issues. With less income farmers have also 
been forced to perform many more tasks themselves, again causing fatigue and 
increasing the likelihood of shortcuts being taken, accidents, emotional breakdowns and 
pressure on neighbours to provide assistance. Alternatively, some farmers have had to 
hire additional help to cope with the extra workload and this has been costly. Financial 
pressures have also increased the size and number of loans taken out by farmers, 
increasing financial burdens and the likelihood of future bankruptcies and farm 
repossessions. 
Farmers also lost grasslands, many of which were burned as part of a firebreak strategy 
which the fire-fighting authorities implemented.  The DSE firefighting strategy, according 
to the farmers, involved fighting the fires on private land rather than in the bush, and as a 
consequence farmers incurred extensive damage to their pastures and fencing. Farmers 
are particularly angry that the DSE’s fire management strategy entailed burning farmers’ 
fields and fences.  They consider that the financial losses they experienced because of 
this could have been avoided had a different firefighting strategy been adopted. There is 
also the issue of re-sowing fields and pastures, given that drought conditions will make 
this difficult. 
 
Farmers express anger over the inadequacy of the compensation available to them to 
repair the damage caused to their fields and fences. Fence damage sustained during the 
firefighting efforts is troublesome for farmers as it increases wild animal and stock loss 
problems, as well as posing a threat to the local community. And even where farmers 
were entitled to apply for compensation, many have not submitted applications for 
government assistance. The Community Development Officer for Towong Shire believes 
that this is partly due to fatigue: 
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When people were finished with firefighting, they had to try to rebuild 
their strength, their energy.  Fatigue affected people’s capacity to 
apply for government assistance.  It seemed like there was a 
mountain of forms to fill out and people were just stuffed. There would 
have been a lot more people who could have applied for assistance 
than those that did. (Towong Shire Community Development Officer) 
 
Assistance that was provided by the government was considered inappropriate.  The 
Department of Human Services provided food parcels for distribution through Upper 
Murray Health Care. But these were not always taken up. One local resident made the 
observation that the use by dates on some of the products included in the food parcels 
had been passed. A local pastor explained that farmers felt ‘too proud’ to ask for these 
food parcels. Cash assistance would have been more suitable, as it would have allowed 
farmers to buy much-needed fodder and farm supplies. The DHS did provide bushfire-
affected communities with small emergency grants of about $200 to $300 each.  But of 
the 170 such grants made available to the North East of Victoria, only two grants were 
received by people in Towong Shire. This was largely because DHS officials did not visit 
the Shire once the crisis had passed. The bulk of the emergency grants were provided to 
Indigo and Alpine Shires.   
 
On the other hand, the Bushfire Recovery Fund was well subscribed by people in 
Towong Shire, with about 600 applications being submitted.  This outcome was 
attributed to the fact that residents were made aware of the Fund by the Community 
Development Officer located in the Shire itself. 
Agriculture and forestry are the dominant industries in the Shire, representing over 60% 
of businesses in the Shire.  Traditional farming activities in beef, dairy and sheep farming 
are predominant, but other more intensive agribusiness and horticultural enterprises are 
developing.  Towong Shire is currently undertaking projects with the support of DIIRD 
working with growers of pyrethrum daisies and essential oil crops to develop appropriate 
infrastructure, extend value adding and expand the economic diversity of the agricultural 
base. 
The tourism industry is also a key element of the local economy.  Focused on the “pure” 
attraction offered by a pristine local environment, an extensive promotional strategy has 
been developed to support local operators and harness the potential of the region 
particularly for ecotourism. 
As at August 2001, 2651 residents of the Towong Shire were employed either full time or 
part time.  137 people were registered as unemployed.  This represents an 
unemployment rate of 4.9%  
In many areas of the Shire economic activity all but ceased for five weeks. No part of the 
Shire’s economic base was untouched by this disaster. The timber harvesting and 
processing industries need to have access to raw materials that are now either damaged 
or inaccessible to them; tourism depends heavily on marketing and promotional 
strategies that centre on the “pure” image of the region and its pristine environment 
which may take years to regenerate; agricultural enterprises rely on water supply that 
has been affected in both quality and quantity.  
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The fires have similarly universally affected individual residents of the Shire.  While not 
all have been called upon to confront fire directly, the impacts on families, workplaces 
and community organisations are real and ongoing. 
While disaster is never welcome, this one could not have come at a more devastating 
time for the communities and businesses of Towong.  Communities, which had 
experienced many years of economic decline and population loss, were beginning to 
turn around. 
Since the fire threat has eased, seventy-five businesses across the Shire were surveyed 
to gauge the economic impact of the fires on both employment numbers and dollar 
values in relation to turnover.  The impact was assessed on both the immediate and 
future result. 
Immediate Effects 
• Six businesses, those specifically associated with the hospitality industry, either 
maintained or increased their turnover.  The majority agreed this was a "spike" 
due to the influx of fire crews. 
• The remaining sixty-nine businesses reported losses in income ranging from 5% 
to 95%.   
• Actual job losses across the Shire, as a direct result of the fire emergency are 54.  
This is an increase of 39% on the 2001 census. 
Future Effects 
• Autumn is the peak season for business operators across the Shire.  With the 
prevailing conditions incomes losses from both rural and other business pursuits 
is estimated to $3,750,000 until the end of the financial year. 
• Reduction in employment numbers is estimated as a further 68 job losses which 
in total will be an increase of 89% above the 2001 census. 
The following table (on page 40) contains some examples of actual businesses affected, 
including the percentage change in activity faced by the business and the effect on the 
business’s employment. 
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Effect of Fire on Towong Shire Businesses 
Business Type of 
Business 
% Change 
in Activity  
Nature of Impact Impact on 
Employment 
1 Caravan Park Over 90% 
down 
No tourists after January 10. Fire 
crew in for two weeks. Lower 
turnover in shop and petrol 
station. No bookings before 
Easter 
2 jobs lost 
2 Fish farm 90% down Production stopped – 
infrastructure 
destroyed/damaged. Stock lost. 
4 jobs lost 
(66%) 
3  Retail (gifts and 
souvenirs) 
90% down No visitors so basically no 
customers. Takings severely 
affected. 
- 
4  Agriculture 
(farm) 
20% down 25% of pasture lost.  - 
5  Tourism 
accommodation 
80% No tourists around. 
Accommodated fire crews. 
2 jobs lost 
6 Motel - No visitors so no guests. 7 jobs lost 
(all) 
7 Timber milling - No access to logging coupes for 
a 6 week period. Reduced stock 
levels. Contractors unwilling to 






and 7 casual 
positions. 
 
The forecast economic impact of the fires across the Shire until the end of the financial 
year is estimated as25: 
Estimated Current Loss $1,100,000 
Estimated Future Loss $3,750,000 
 $4,850,000 
Estimated indirect loss $8,730,000 
due to lost time, etc. 
at a multiplier of 1.8 
 
Estimated income $3,416,000 
foregone from the 
loss of 122 EFT 
jobs 
 
Total estimated loss $16,996,00026  
 
                                                 
25 Towong Shire, Economic and Community Recovery and Renewal Strategy 2003, pg 8 
26 This represents 17% of the Shire’s Gross Regional Product 
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4.4.2 Social impacts 
 
Two Focus Group consultations were undertaken in Towong Shire, one at Corryong and 
the other at Tallangatta, on 9 July 2003.  Twenty one people met with researchers (Dr 
Scott Phillips and Mr Michael Gangemi) – nine in Corryong and twelve in Tallangatta.  
The participants included representatives of local government, volunteer emergency 
services (CFA and Red Cross), churches, farmers and small business operators.  
 
The bushfires that swept through the Towong Shire, describe the bushfires as the worst 
in the history of the region, burned for a period of six weeks during January and 
February.  They had a major impact on people in both economic and social terms.   
 
The bushfires placed people throughout Towong Shire under great mental and 
emotional  stress. This is reflected in people’s descriptions of the fires variously as 
‘frightening’, ‘exhausting’, ‘overwhelming’, and ‘devastating’ and the use of words such 
as ‘anger’, ‘frustration’, ‘confused’, ‘helpless’ and ‘ashamed’ to describe their feelings.  
Residents reported difficulty in sleeping or going about normal life because of the stress, 
apprehension and anxiety caused by with fires burning around them. As one person put 
it:  
 
It was stressful living with a constant ‘“what if?” factor’, a sense that 
the fire might engulf your business or your home. In the back of 
people’s mind was the nagging question: “Do we pack the car?” 
(Local small business operator). 
 
 
Some likened it to living in a war zone or a nuclear winter and as suffering from post-
traumatic stress.  The atmosphere was pervaded by dense-particle smoke. This affected 
people’s breathing – especially the elderly.  One senior Corryong resident said that 
people experienced ‘breathlessness’ and were ‘frightened’ by the thick fog of smoke that 
descended on the town. Another remark captured the disorientation and discomfort that 
people experienced:  
 
Living in constant smoke was very difficult – a really filthy existence.  
They were shocking conditions to live in for six weeks.  For people in 
the area, there was a sense of their lives being out of control. (Ray 
Park, CEO of Towong Shire) 
 
Generally, residents have had to deal with burns, sleep deficiency, depression, 
helplessness, anger, worry, stress, confusion, anxiety and vindictiveness, leading to 
problems of drug dependency, excessive drinking and smoking, moodiness, irrational 
behaviour aggressiveness and eating disorders. There are fears that in the long term 
these problems will lead to the further problems of domestic violence, suicide, emotional 
abuse and family breakdown. A worry is that anniversaries of the fires will trigger 
flashbacks and re-occurring emotions. 
Families were separated during the fires. With this came feelings of isolation and 
anxiety. It was quite common for families to send their children away (sometimes for up 
to six weeks) to stay with relatives outside the fire zone. The effects of this separation on 
the children have manifested themselves in some behavioural issues. Attention-seeking 
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behaviours are interpreted by some locals as symptomatic of the fear that some children 
have of being separated from their parents again (Mitta Valley Resident).  Children have 
also been required to perform more work on farms in the post-fire period, leading to fears 
their school work may suffer.  
 
Husbands and wives were separated from each other for extensive periods of time.  
While local men were away on volunteer firefighting duties, their wives were left at home 
with the children. Women, too, were parted from their families when they took up 
volunteer roles with the Red Cross or the CFA, often paying related expenses out of their 
own pockets, for which they have not been reimbursed.  
 
Women ‘left at home’ on isolated farms, according to a volunteer Communications 
Officer with the CFA, felt ‘hopeless’ and ‘isolated’, as they were largely bereft of 
information about the location and behaviour of the fires. While local community radio 
station RTR 94.9 was accessible to residents at all times during the fires and did provide 
updates on a regular basis, residents felt that they were let down by the ABC and 
commercial radio networks. One local resident stated that the reporting by some of the 
radio stations was “hysterical and sensationalised”, while the local community radio 
station, RTR 94.9 “provided the facts”.  To address their sense of isolation and anxiety, a 
telephone tree was organized by the local CFA Brigade to relay updates about changes 
in the fire conditions via contacts in designated areas (who would then make telephone 
contact with farms and homes in their area).  
 
More generally, farms and families in fire-affected areas were cut off from social contact 
for extended periods.  People in the caring professions (priests, pastors, nurses) noted 
that they were denied ready access to people isolated by the fires because they were 
not recognized as accredited professionals by the Police and the officials managing the 
Incident Control Centre.  Only professionals with a ‘pecuniary interest’ in the fire-fighting 
(that is, someone concerned with protecting assets) were allowed into the fire-affected 
area.  Pastors and nurses had to secure official approval from the ICC every time they 
attempted to undertake pastoral visits.  The Roman Catholic priest explained that it was 
only in the third week of the bushfires that he got access to the fire area so he could visit 
families and listen to their stories.  He found people pained by their isolation. 
 
Part of their pain was caused by their feeling of being deprived of visits by the 
district nurse, and of being deprived of pastoral visits. (Corryong Roman Catholic 
Priest) 
 
But there is another dimension to people’s feelings of isolation which was associated 
with their sense of being largely unsupported in their desire to fight the fires that were 
threatening them and their livelihoods.  As one local resident observed, when asked to 
describe how he felt at the time of the fires: 
 
We felt totally isolated.  I mean no-one seemed to want to do anything about the 
fires. (Local farmer) 
 
Behind these sorts of remarks is a palpable anger about what local people see as gross 
mismanagement of the firefighting effort. This is described by some people as ‘the other 
story’ about the bushfires which needs to come out. Local people in Towong frequently 
put the view that the mismanagement of the fire fighting caused unnecessary loss of 
stock and damage to their fences, grass lands, capital equipment and property.   
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CFA volunteers described themselves as ‘completely in conflict’ with the CFA 
professionals and the DSE ‘bureaucrats’ from Melbourne. (Local farmer) What emerges 
from people’s accounts -  ‘the other story’ - is a situation of two conflicting cultures – one 
associated with bureaucratic professionalism and legalism, the other with rural 
pragmatism and flexibility.  This conflict between ‘the hierarchy’ and the rural volunteers  
has several dimensions, each of which highlights significant problems in the way key 
actors related to each other through the formalized firefighting structures, centred around 
the Incident Control Centre (ICC) set up at Corryong.     
 
One aspect of the conflict was associated with the under-utilisation and under-valuing of 
Towong people’s local knowledge by the outside professionals who came into the area 
to manage the ICC. Local farmers, with a long history of involvement in fighting hill fires, 
were largely excluded from ICC operations, despite offering their advice and services.   
 
People characterized the situation as one where there were, in effect, two sorts of CFA.  
On one hand there were the local CFA brigades, made up of local people who 
understand local conditions, terrain, roads and bulldozer tracks into the bush.  These 
were under the control of a local Brigade or Group Captain.  On the other hand there 
were the CFA ‘strike teams’, made up of externally-sourced professionals. These strike 
teams were under the control of the ICC, managed by DSE officials.   
 
Local CFA firefighters expressed their belief that they should have been included on the 
trucks of externally-sourced ‘strike teams’ – especially when outside teams came from 
flat country around Melbourne or the Wimmera.  Locals explained that ‘flat country 
people’ neither understand how hill fires behave nor have the knowledge of the local 
roads. Consequently, when local knowledge was not utilized by the ICC commanders, 
‘strike teams’ frequently got lost on dead-end roads. This reduced the efficiency of the 
firefighting effort, as fire trucks often failed to reach farms and communities threatened 
by fires. 
 
A related facet of the conflict between the two CFAs concerned the operational focus of 
the ICC. As local volunteers explained, the ICC model was implemented not as a system 
for supporting local fire fighters, but as a system for totally controlling the firefighting 
effort.  As a result, local CFA volunteers were not utilized, and felt isolated from what 
they frequently described as ‘the system’.  
 
Effectively, then, there was a conflict about objectives. And these, in turn, reveal two 
different underlying models in people’s mind about how best to respond to a bush fire. 
This theme emerged strongly in the accounts of Towong residents. The local CFA 
volunteers are farmers who have a mentality of attacking and putting out fires in the 
bush and on farmland.  The DSE officials, on the other hand, were focused more on 
controlling the fires by bulldozing containment lines across farms at the perimeter of 
the National Parks forests. DSE officials did not favour using dozer trails to fight fires in 
the forest. 
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This divergence of objectives greatly frustrated local people: 
 
Fires were not dealt with when they were still relatively benign. Locals asked the 
DSE co-coordinators to put the fires out, but they said they were concerned with 
controlling the fires. We saw some areas and properties burned out because of 
this, and it was unnecessary. (Local farmer) 
 
Fire water trucks were left idle, and so were their crews, because the DSE were 
committed to controlling the fires by putting in containment lines instead of putting 
the fires out. (Local farmer and CFA volunteer) 
 
It will take a long time for DSE to regain credibility here because of their strategy 
to put containment lines through people’s farms, so they could fight the fires on 
private land rather than in the bush. (Local farmer/ small business operator and 
CFA volunteer) 
 
Underlying these opposing objectives was a conflict about conservation of the forests 
and about what constitutes an asset worthy of protection. Whereas farmers had 
campaigned for fuel reduction and the maintenance of fire trails into the bush, the DSE 
opposed back burning and had allowed fire trails to become grown over. As regards 
asset protection, there was a similar difference of views.  Farmers have a practical and 
vital interest in protecting no only their homes but also their livestock, pastures, fences 
and capital equipment.  The city-based managers who took control of the ICC, on the 
other hand, reflected an essentially urban concern with the home as a family’s key asset. 
CFA teams therefore were instructed by ICC managers to focus only on protecting farm 
houses and outbuildings, but not to be concerned with preserving livestock or pasture or 
fences or capital equipment.    It was only private firefighters – farmers with a water tank 
on the back of a truck – who protected farm stock and equipment by putting out spot 
fires as soon a s they started. 
 
Nevertheless, local people’s frustration over what they describe as the mismanagement 
of the firefighting has not dampened their commitment to volunteerism.  They are, 
however, reconsidering how best to organise their volunteer fire fighting efforts in future.  
 
The experience this time has led people to think that, in future, they’ll make their 
own arrangements. People locally feel that the system was frustrating, remote 
from realtiy. (Local farmer/small business operator and CFA volunteer) 
 
All these communities here are very isolated and have survived because of 
voluntarism.  How will they cope in the future, because their volunteer spirit has 
been exhausted? (Local farmer and CFA volunteer)  
 
The volunteer efforts of the Red Cross were widely applauded throughout Towong.  Red 
Cross volunteers provided critical support counseling for CFA firefighters who were 
stressed by being away from their farms, homes and families.  Red Cross people worked 
long shifts as First Aiders, monitoring the welfare of firefighters and residents and 
referring people to hospitals when necessary.  And they spent long hours in a community 
kitchen in Corryong on catering duty.  These ladies ‘were beside themselves with worry 
about their farms and husbands exposed to the fires.’ (Red Cross Volunteer) 
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When Red Cross caterers were stood down by the DSE caterers there was a sense of 
relief.  But tension arose when Red Cross volunteers were instructed by the ICC 
management not to provide coffee and cakes to fire teams because of hygiene 
concerns.  The Red Cross volunteers also reported feeling frustrated when they 
prepared lunch packs for the firefighters, only to learn from the ICC that these were not 
needed.  
 
But the story is not all bad.  DSE and CFA managers were praised for calling regular 
public meetings to provide information to the public about the fires and their fire fighting 
strategies.  Local people said they respected the honest way in which DSE and CFA 
officers communicated with them at these meetings 
 
The Shire Council was also praised for its efforts in providing support to the ICC.  Local 
government’s role was managed consistent with the Municipal Emergency Plan.  Under 
this Plan, local governments only can assume a role in the co-ordination of support when 
a Municipal Emergency Co-ordination Centre (MECC) is set up.  This is usually done at 
the request of the local Police. 
 
The MECC and the ICC effectively work as complementary units.  An ICC is only set up 
once a bush fire reaches a certain level of threat to community safety (Stage 3).Its role is 
to organise firefighting efforts.  A MECC is set up to co-ordinate the provision of support 
services and equipment in line with ICC requirements. The sort of support provided by 
the MECC included providing firefighters with portaloos, towels, freezers, extra tents and 
a wide range of capital equipment – including utes, graders, trucks and other plant and 
equipment such as “Road Closed” signs. The only issue that emerged concerned some 
difficulties in communication.  While the fire effort was being managed from one location 
(the ICC in Corryong), co-ordination of support services was managed from another 
location (the MECC in Tallangatta). It was important for the MECC to communicate with 
the ICC so as to keep the community informed through a 24 hour telephone line and the 
distribution via fax of DSE update reports. 
 
Perhaps the CEO of the Shire Council expressed the wider sentiments of people when 
he said that the fires had been ‘an incredibly tough time for everyone’.  He predicted that 
the Federal and State inquiries were likely to focus on apportioning blame and 
highlighting issues with the operations of agencies such as DSE and the CFA.  This, in 
his view, was appropriate: problems need to be identified and remedied if fire prevention 
and firefighting is to be improved in the future.  But the CEO of Towong Shire suggested 
that people need also to focus on the positives that came out of the experience.  These 
included: the strength of local leadership; the capabilities of people (particularly the 
bravery of the CFA fire fighters and the heroic efforts of the volunteers more generally); 
the capacity of community organizations to work together in a time of crisis; the enduring 
value of volunteerism; and the sense of pride people drew from the community pulling 
together. 
 
One of the participants in the Towong focus groups, Simon Paton, is the Convener of the 
Eureka Project, a study of the bushfires in Victoria’s North East.  The report submitted 
under his name, is entitled A Case of Burning Neglect.  
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The Foreword to the report speaks of the anguish of local farmers being ‘fanned by the 
certain knowledge that with effective management this disaster could have been 
avoided’. (Eureka Project, 2003: 2) It continues:  
 
There is a simmering outrage about the incompetence, competing agendas and 
political opportunism that masquerades as conservation policy for city 
consumption.  On top of all this, North East Victorians are numb with the fear that 
a similar disaster could occur once again next summer.  Nothing has changed. 
(Eureka Project 2003: 2)  
 
Farmers feel that they have been excluded from the policy debate about forest 
management and fire prevention planning.  The report therefore calls for greater 
involvement of the wider community in setting conservation and fire prevention policies. 
(Eureka Project 2003: 4) 
 
What is called for is a more inclusive, participatory approach to governance, that enables 
local people to have input to not only policy development but also local volunteer-based  
firefighting.  As the report notes: 
The people of North East Victoria have reflected on the fire crisis with notable 
composure and clarity of thought.  They offer a powerful and well argued case for 
local involvement in managing and implementing conservation policy, and for 
gutting the CFA of its highly paid “policrats” in return for reinvestment in 
grassroots firefighting capability. 
 
The report also emphasizes that, for North East Victorians, ‘the overwhelming concern is 
the manner in which the fires were fought. Here again the clash between city based  
professionals and local volunteers emerges as a major issue: 
 
The DSE and CFA operated under a centralized incident command system which 
meant that huge ‘control centres’ were established and all useful authority was 
vested in city based staff – or inexperienced or unqualified ‘ring ins’ – who were 
brought in to direct the firefighting effort with little or no local knowledge. (Eureka 
Project 2003: 12) 
 
In Summary 
The people of Towong Shire felt isolated during and since the fires.  They feel betrayed 
by politicians who failed to visit communities beyond Beechworth.  They feel betrayed by 
the bureaucratic system that largely excluded them from fire prevention planning prior to 
fires breaking out and firefighting efforts once they did. Their sense of frustration is 
heightened by a sense that it could happen again.   Consequently a number of 
recommendations emerged from the focus group discussions in Corryong and 
Tallangatta. 
  
• Country people need to have a stronger involvement in setting the objectives for fire 
prevention and fire fighting. If the objectives in future are built around fuel reduction 
(through regular back-burning in the National Park lands) and putting out fires as 
and where they first start, there will be less fire damage in North East Victoria in the 
future. 
• The local knowledge of CFA Volunteers needs to be valued more in the future.  Fire 
management structures put in place in the future should be aimed at supporting 
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local firefighters rather than importing a ‘professional’ fire management machinery 
largely unconnected to local CFA expertise and team structures. 
• Dozer tracks and fire trails that were made in the wilderness areas during the fires 
should be maintained, despite DSE’s preference to allow these trails to be filed in 
and revegetated.  Local firefighters believe that the dozer trails could help local 
brigades to fight fires in the bush in future, rather than allow them to burn out of 
control towards private farmlands and livestock. 
• The ‘asset protection’ objective with which the CFA and DSE operate needs to be 
re-formulated so that it recognizes that farmers’ assets include not just their homes 
but their grasses, fodder, livestock, fences, outbuildings and capital equipment. This 
would help to inform a re-assessment of fire fighting strategies for country Victoria 
(and rural communities more generally). 
• Fire management authorities need to respect the communication needs of people in 
isolated valley communities, who suffer from poor radio reception.  In the event of 
future fires, greater priority should be placed on disseminating regular and accurate 
updates to these communities about fire conditions and behaviour. 
• People in the caring professions (pastors and district nurses) need to be given some 
sort of accreditation to facilitate their access to communities in fire-affected areas.  
This will help to ensure that people’s sense of isolation and their spiritual needs are 
better addressed in the future. 
  
4.4.3 The Towong Shire Council Response 
The Towong Shire Council, in consultation with the Towong community, has prepared a 
strategic response to the bushfires. This is an integrated strategy that brings together a 
series of specific and targeted short, medium and long term renewal initiatives, “focused 
at a range of levels, from individual communities and industries to Shire wide initiatives 
and those which will dovetail with the efforts of neighbouring Shires that are also bush 
fire affected”27. 
The following is a list of some of these recovery and renewal initiatives, including the 
objectives of the initiatives. 
Following the bushfires of January/February 2003, the Towong Shire Council conducted 
a series of community and Business consultations to garner community and business 
attitudes to the bushfires, measure short-term and future impacts, and determine what 
needs to be done to ensure recovery and future well being. These sessions were 
conducted in Dartmouth, Mitta Mitta and Eskdale, Corryong, and with the Upper Murray 
Health Service. The following is a list of the Short-Term Impacts, Future Impacts, and 
Recovery and Future Wellbeing issues raised at these meetings: 
                                                 
27 Towong Shire, Economic and Community Recovery and Renewal Strategy 2003, pg 4 
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Short-Term Impacts 
• Loss of prime tourist attractions 
• Lost prime business opportunities over the Easter long weekend – estimated loss 
$245,000 
• Poor water quality 
• Cancellation of fishing competition – estimated loss $400,000 
• White water rafting business ceased operations after losses of $135,000 
• Mitta Muster Cancelled 
• Lack of information and incorrect information about the fires caused high stress in 
the community 
• Corryong saw mill and contractors unable to harvest or extract timber for six 
weeks 
• Safety of logging contractors going into burned out areas is a concern 
• Three Corryong based weed control businesses have had contracts terminated 
by NSW National parks – 5 EFT jobs lost and loss of $250,000 
• The Man From Snowy River Bush Festival cancelled – loss of $30,000 in entry 
fees alone 
• Local trade dropped to essential supplies only 
• High levels of stress and anxiety amongst at risk frail aged and disabled 
population 
• High hospital admittance rate for people who were oxygen dependent and other 
raspatory conditions 
• Increased social and emotional issues presenting 
• Rise in domestic violence and family breakdown 
• Concern about the social and emotional wellbeing of children and youth 
• Staffing at hospitals became a real issue 
• Hospitals were left out of emergency service information networks 
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Future Impacts 
• Rainfall will result in massive fish kills in creeks, rivers and lakes caused by ash, 
topsoil, debris and fire retardant washing into water supplies 
• The Dart Cup, a major fishing competition held in June, is now threatened – 
potential loss $500,000 
• Hospital staff are becoming ill and needing time off work 
Future and Wellbeing 
• Local and regional marketing campaigns highlighting that the area is not burned 
and there is still lots to see and do 
• Restocking of fish in rivers, streams and Lake Dartmouth 
• Marketing assistance to rebuild fishing competitions and develop new products 
and attractions 
• Small replacement event for the Mitta Muster (mini muster) 
• Local infrastructure projects to provide work for tradesmen and trade for suppliers 
• Increased social counselling and specialist counselling services 
• Increased funding for youth activities and services 
 
4.4.4 The total economic effect of the bushfire on the Towong Shire 
 
When all of these factors were taken into account in our economic model of the region, 
we estimated that the effect of the bushfires on the level of economic activity for the 
period when the threat arose (some time in January) until the present (the end of May), 
across the Shire of Towong, was a loss of production and income of $11.7 million. Refer 
to section 6 for details. 
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5 GIPPSLAND REGION 
5.1 Profile of the Region 
 
The Gippsland region encompasses the Wellington and East Gippsland Shires. There 
was little property fire damage within Wellington Shire, although as we will see many 
local communities within the shire were impacted. East Gippsland Shire, however, 
suffered significant bushfire damage.   
East Gippsland Shire comprises approximately 38,000 people. It has a Labour Force of 
some 15,000 people. The areas directly affected by the fires were in the highlands of the 
Great Dividing Range, spanning an area from Mt. Bogong in the west to the Cobberas to 
the east. The areas include some significant river systems, including the Mitta Mitta, 
Mitchell, Nicholson, Tambo and Snowy river systems. High country streams provide 
water for local townships and farms in those areas.28  
Settlements in the affected areas within East Gippsland are quite dispersed, and are 
served with an extensive road network.  The main townships directly affected by the wild 
fires were Omeo and Swifts Creek, both of which house 250-300 residents. Other nearby 
townships such as Tongio has similar numbers of residents.29 Like highland townships 
further to the west in Wellington Shire, while not directly affected by the fires, merit 
examination (townships include Dargo, Licola, Heyfield and Walhalla, amongst others). 
The Omeo-Tambo Valley differs from other areas in East Gippsland in that it houses a 
relatively young population (although the on-farm population is more middle-aged), the 
proportion of children in population is comparatively high, men outnumber women, there 
is high unemployment outside the townships, and household incomes are below regional 
averages.30 The high country areas of Wellington and East Gippsland are largely public 
lands. Parks and adjoining areas are major tourist areas. They include significant 
recreational and commercial fishing rivers and streams, terrain of high conservation and 
landscape significance, and major forests. Recreational facilities and services include 
walking trails, horseback riding tracks, adventure driving tracks, canoeing and rafting 
opportunities, picnic and camping areas, caravan parks, tourist accommodation 
premises, and general stores. The valleys and high plains in the region cater for 
breeding and grazing of sheep and cattle, as well as some agriculture (including the 
production of herbs, berries, grapes, and nuts).31  
The fires burned almost 1 million hectares of land in East Gippsland. Approximately 
50,000ha of this was freehold land, mostly in the Mitta Mitta River, Tambo, and Snowy 
river catchments. Fires burned approximately 350,000ha of public land in the East 
Gippsland Catchment Management Authority Region, and impacted the 
Tambo/Nicholson and Snowy River water catchment areas. The Pinnabar State Forest 
was also ravaged by the fires.32  
                                                 
28 East Gippsland Shire (2003) East Gippsland Bushfire Recovery – Integrated Submission. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid; Tourism Victoria (c2002) Gippsland has it all: Official Visitors’ Guide, Melbourne. 
32 East Gippsland Shire (2003) East Gippsland Bushfire Recovery report. 
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5.2. East Gippsland Shire 
 
5.2.1 Social Impact 
The psychosocial effects of the fires are difficult to quantify. The impacts varied within 
the region depending on the locations and proximity to the fires. As detailed under 
economic impact below, in East Gippsland there was significant destruction and damage 
to homes, farming areas and facilities (including fencing, sheds, livestock, fodder, and 
local dams), tourism areas, conservation and high quality natural environments, historic 
buildings, and both public and private infrastructure (such as roads, and bridges). 
However, the impact of the fires was much more widely spread within the Gippsland 
region. 
The lengthy time that communities in the vicinity of the fires (including communities like 
Dargo and Licola far west of the bushfire front) had to stay alert, to prepare for possible 
fires, and be ready to protect their properties from the fires (up to 20 nights) was a 
marked drain on their physical, social and psychological health of people in those 
communities. A typical observation: 
'It had a dramatic affect on their sleep patterns. They are still feeling the 
effects' (community health officer). 
Residents’ health was harmed by or certainly at risk from the smoke and haze produced 
by the fires. Certainly, respiratory conditions were exacerbated by conditions.33 
Moreover, individuals involved in fire fighting activities had to cope with the prospect of 
their homes being threatened, and in some cases, burned by the fires during their 
absence. They felt that they had ‘let their families down’:  
'They feel that they have let their families down by not being at home 
when it was being threatened' (community health officer).  
There was considerable disruption to family life and social links. Some fire crews have 
been fighting fires in Victoria since November 2002 (government official). Children were 
often sent away during the duration of the fires while their parents protected their homes 
and/or fought the fires.  
'The kids were traumatized by the separation and their experience of the 
fires [through community consultations and media images]' (community 
health officer). 
  
'A lot of children suffered at the time because their mums and dads 
stayed behind to fight the fires. Some teachers took in some of the kids. 
And on the kids' return they've had no social activities because they've 
been helping their parents fix the damage' (visitor information centre). 
Local communities and families felt isolated and sometimes assistance was said by 
locals to be inappropriate (example: receipt of cheques rather than cash from 
government authorities). Road access closures, loss of schooling, mobile library and 
other community services, and broken communication/telephone lines exacerbated the 
                                                 
33 Ibid; Bush nurse, 2003. 
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feelings of isolation within local communities in the region, especially in areas directly 
impacted by the fires, but to varying degrees by communities threatened by or involved 
in fighting the fires.34 
Not surprisingly, the East Gippsland Shire (2003) stated that: 
‘An unusually large number of calls to the East Gippsland recovery centre 
come from individuals seeking counselling services, underlying the 
degree to which anticipation of the fire and the sense of being cut off 
preyed on people’s minds.’ 
Families also suffered financially because of their involvement in fighting the fires. Many 
people lost income not just for the duration of the fires, say 6 to 8 weeks, but overall for 
about 6 months.  
'Since most farmers had two jobs, they lost the part time job while fighting 
the fires - so they lost their primary and secondary sources of income' 
(community health officer). 
 
'Farms were burned out and people lost their homes. There are still no 
fences, stock feed, livestock is on the roadways, and the people are 
wondering what they're going to live on in the winter' (bush nurse). 
Yet, because people in the region are so resilient and proud they refused donations of 
food ('We'll get through it' being a common response) even though they were, and in 
many cases, are still in need of assistance (community health officer). 
As a report coordinated by the East Gippsland Shire noted, there were also dangers to 
public health with the fire’s destruction of animals, the release of hazardous materials, 
and pollution of drinking water (with ash and other pollutants).35 While the threat of the 
fires in many ways had the effect of marshalling the resources of communities, the fires 
also had the effect of creating divisions within communities where it was perceived that 
some families/properties were given priority service by fire crews.  As a community 
health official said: 
'There is lots of community anger about who got the fire trucks first at 
their door - a rich versus poor thing - a perception within the community'. 
Similarly some businesses were perceived by some to be treated more favourably by fire 
fighters seeking sustenance and short term accommodation (local business operator). It 
was argued by local officials that there is an urgent need for mediation and community 
building services in the aftermath of the fires, especially in the hardest hit areas such as 
Omeo. 
It was also relayed that many fire fighters are finding it mentally taxing to cope with fire 
recovery efforts, particularly the review of fire operations and local community criticisms. 
Moreover, it was reported that volunteer fire fighters felt let down because they are not 
eligible fore Centrelink assistance. 
                                                 
34 East Gippsland Shire (2003) East Gippsland Bushfire Recovery report. 
35 Ibid; Community health official, 2003. 
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The severity of the fires has reduced the medium-to-long term productivity of the soils 
and hence the value of the grazing lands, such as in Omeo Valley. People are also 
concerned about their normal sources of water; the availability of sufficient water 
supplies (some have had to purchase water); and local water quality following runoff 
from badly burned catchment areas. 
While the impact of the fires on peoples' personal health and social well-being was most 
obviously felt in parts of the east Gippsland region, the fires also adversely affected 
individuals, families and communities in central Gippsland. Many fire fighters from 
central Gippsland no doubt suffered with stress and smoke inhalation during and, for 
some, following the fires - for many of the same reasons outlined above. Likewise, their 
incomes would also have been reduced for the duration of the fires and possibly longer. 
The separation of the central Gippsland fire fighters from their families severely disrupted 
normal family life and a sense of security. Locals have related instances where 
individuals who fought the fires are still traumatized in some way (Dargo locals). 
According to the bush nursing service and others at Dargo, locals suffered considerable 
stress at the time of the fires, with some families leaving the area, but it was thought that 
there were no significant ongoing health problems arising from the fires - at least not to 
the extent reported in East Gippsland.  
5.2.2 Economic and environmental impact  
The major economic impact was clearly felt in the eastern part of the Gippsland region 
and most particularly in places such as Omeo, Cobungra, Swifts Creek, Wulgulmerang, 
and Gelantipy to the east. As we will see, the fires impacted areas in Wellington Shire as 
well (although much less directly). However, the severity of the impact of the fires on 
areas to the east is reflected in part by the physical damage that they wrought in those 
areas. Property damage in East Gippsland included the loss of 36 homes and 21 
woolsheds. It also experienced the loss or damage to about 175 other significant 
buildings (including heritage places, mining relics and historic houses). Approximately 
3,450 cattle (across 50 farms), 8,900 sheep (on 40 farms), 13 horses, 65 goats, and 
other animals were killed or badly injured by the fires. Over 2,600km of fencing was 
destroyed, and there was damage or loss of machinery, stock yards, stores of feed, 
perennial pastures, tree crops and other assets.36 Further, a government official 
considered that:  
‘Of the farms affected in Gippsland 90 % have major financial issues and 
20 – 30 % will go broke. Fires didn’t directly affect all of the farms in the 
region, but most lost production as farmers were away fighting the fires.’ 
Moreover, public infrastructure assets worth $11.83M were damaged or destroyed by the 
fires. They included major and minor roads, bridges, road furniture, drainage systems, 
recreation and tourist facilities, as well as privately owned power distribution networks, 
and communication and telecommunication equipment.37  
Apart from the obvious economic costs incurred where farms lost their homes, water 
sources, crops, outbuildings, livestock, fencing, equipment, and fodder to the fires, some 
of the most severely burned land became less economically productive, with significantly 
                                                 
36 East Gippsland Shire (2003) East Gippsland Bushfire Recovery report. 
37 Ibid. 
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more land required to produce the same level of farm output achieved prior to the fires. 
Some of these farms were possibly only marginally viable notwithstanding the fires. Wool 
crops were damaged with often forced sales bringing low returns. This has been 
exacerbated with livestock washed away in recent storms in the Omeo area (rural 
community development officer; local information officer). 
In some areas in East Gippsland the fires were so intense that they burned through the 
soil surface to kill seeds needed for future growth. Further, there is the danger that 
unless good ground cover develops before snow falls, snow melting later in the year may 
result in soil erosion and significant pollution of local waterways. Aerial views show ash 
from the fires now reaching lakes (government and local government officials).  This 
could also harm local fishing industries that are based on mountain stream fishing (local 
fishing operator). 
Further, the fires harmed the timber industry. The fires have significantly reduced the 
extent of mature forests available for logging. The industry has an opportunity to salvage 
Ash forest species over the next 18 months that it would ordinarily do over 5 years 
(subject to road access). However, apart from the reductions in timber for milling caused 
by the fires, the industry is facing cutbacks in logging rates to achieve sustainable yields. 
This will, other things being equal, have a significant impact on the local economies and 
employment.  
Notwithstanding the major damage to those communities directly hit by the fires, the fires 
have hurt many other communities in East Gippsland. For instance, the East Gippsland 
Shire (2003) has reported that there were also several areas not directly touched by the 
fires that were also detrimentally affected:  
'Some, such as Buchan and Bruthen, had good reason to fear that they would be 
next in line to feel the fires' impact. Others, such as Bairnsdale, Orbost and 
Bendoc, operated as bases for fire response activity. Many, including Ensay and 
Cassilis, suffered economic effects due to loss of trade from tourism or from the 
inability of timber harvesting and haulage operators to access coupes. And still 
others provided large numbers of volunteers to fight fires or support the front-line 
crews and local residents.'  
Wellington Shire officials and locals in Wellington Shire offer much the same views. 
Although local communities within Wellington Shire were not as ravaged by the fires as 
they were in Omeo, for instance, they convincingly argue that many of them, too, were 
adversely affected by the fires.   This is worth exploring to highlight the indirect effects 
not only in Wellington but also in East Gippsland. 
For example, Dargo Township in Wellington Shire, a significant tourist destination, was a 
sizeable NRE staging communication/co-ordination area for people fighting fires to the 
east of Dargo. The Municipal Emergency Resources (MER) Manager at Wellington Shire 
related that the government's bushfire recovery program overlooked Dargo. He pointed 
out that the fires damaged properties near Dargo, but that this has not been taken into 
account. While physical fire damage in areas near Dargo was limited, he and others 
consider that businesses in the Township were nonetheless significantly harmed by the 
fires.  
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They point out that general public access to Dargo was restricted from Princes Highway 
and other main routes during the fires and that this had a deleterious effect on the trade 
of some local businesses, including the Dargo Mill Tavern, Caravan Park, and Dargo 
Motor Inn.  The owner of the Dargo General Store explained that:  
'Dargo was a ghost town because of the fires up until Easter. Takings were down 
compared with previous years. The Easter weekend was OK, but it didn't make 
up for the loss, and since Easter we've been well down'. 
He noted, for example, that his business has yet to return to pre-fire levels in terms of 
business from adventure trip customers. 
'Adventure tracks for 4-wheel and bikes in the Wonnangatta station were not re-
opened until Easter. And they still can't get to Dargo from the northeast, although 
they now can from Licola'. 
A large part of this trade comes from the northeast (including the Bright, Mansfield, 
Seymour, Wangaratta areas), but this has dropped about 50 per cent since the fires, he 
said. 
The Dargo Mill Tavern operator expressed a like point of view adding that the adventure 
tracks had been blocked [by government authorities] for the most lucrative months of the 
year.  
'Two months after the bushfires and the tourist tracks had still not been opened 
[by government authorities].  No one was allowed in. Business slowed down in a 
period when we would normally be booked out' (Mill Tavern operator).  
Tour operators, such as Overland Gold Adventures, have been restricted from resuming 
business in the high country. According to a local tour operator, guided tours (including 
four-wheel drive and bushwalking trips) into the high country have declined significantly, 
and have still not entirely recovered from the direct and indirect impacts of the fires. 
Wellington Shire staff also reported that the fires significantly affected weekend 
expeditions to areas such as Wonnangatta and Dargo High Plains. One operator 
explained that local tour operators also rely to some extent on passing trade from 
Melbourne-Sydney tour buses, but that this trade had fallen during and since the fires, 
even though some areas were not under immediate threat. It was believed that the 
number of bus tours between Sydney and Melbourne has declined due in part to media 
stories about the damage of the fires.  
Tour operators working in areas as far west as Walhalla reported a marked decline in 
business from late January through to early March, even though these areas were well 
removed from the fires to the east. As one adventure tour operator explained, 'The TV 
showed the fires and frightened people away'. However, he noted that business has 
since started to return to normal. Another operator in Licola reported that small weekend 
bookings fell away during the fires and through to the end of March. Even so, business 
was lighter than usual in March.  
Regardless, whether business had since rebounded was little consolation, it was said, 
given that the businesses were essentially 'closed down' in the high season because of 
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the fires and are not expected to return to trading levels that are more viable until 
November this year.  Even this was subject to a rider, as he noted: 
'This is provided the tracks are repaired and re-opened this quickly. But if we go 
on the experience of the 1988 fires around Licola and Cobbannah they won't be 
opened for 4 years' (adventure tour operator). 
The owner of the Dargo Hotel also explained that the Dargo's tourist trade was markedly 
reduced during the period of the fires. She was particularly concerned about the longer 
term and the effect on tourism in the area, particularly given that Dargo has not featured 
in tourist promotion of areas affected by the fires. Many business people in the central 
Gippsland region echoed this view.  
Several people made the point that some businesses were affected more than others by 
the fires - especially those reliant on summer and autumn trade and offering services or 
products not demanded by the fire fighters and related workers. As a local rural 
community development officer observed: 
'Some businesses did OK, but others did not. Some businesses such as 
accommodation and food places have done OK where they've had fire fighters. 
Others selling local crafts, books and the like have not.'  
So, generally speaking, food premises and places of accommodation were less 
detrimentally affected than traders selling local crafts, gifts and products. Even so, not all 
food and accommodation premises were able to meet their normal high season trading 
levels.  For instance, the Dargo Mill Tavern reported that it lost accommodation bookings 
in January that were never replaced by local fire fighters who were stationed in the 
Township. In addition, the Dargo Motor Inn and Caravan Park lost most of their trade 
during this period - trade not compensated by fire fighters seeking accommodation. 
Similarly, there are reported cases where local stores have accepted credit from 
struggling farmers, and are thus placing their livelihoods at risk.  
Finally, the fires have had a significant environmental impact on the region. Comment 
has already been made on the severity of the fires and the medium to medium-term 
damage to regrowth of vegetation (although perhaps not weeds), as well as the harm to 
water sources and water quality. The fires, and the activities designed to restrict them, 
have reportedly threatened many fauna and flora species, together with some important 
indigenous and archaeological sites and historical structures in the highlands.38 
The social, environmental and economic effects of the fires aside, the experience 
highlighted, according to government officials, a need to improve the capacity to deal 
with fire recovery operations while simultaneously fighting fire fronts.  Comments were 
also made that this could be achieved in part by centralising and co-ordinating recovery 
operations locally rather than in Melbourne. 
5.2.3 The economic total effect of the bushfire on East Gippsland Shire 
 
When all of these factors were taken into account in our economic model of the region, 
we estimated that the effect of the bushfires on the level of economic activity for the 
                                                 
38 Ibid; government officials. 
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period when the threat arose (some time in January) until the present (the end of May), 
across the Shire of East Gippsland, was a loss of production and income of $40.9 
million. This of course excludes the indirect impact of the fires on adjoining Wellington 
Shire and should therefore be considered to be a conservative estimate of the fire’s 
economic impact in the Gippsland region. Refer to section 6 for details. 
 
6 THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF THE BUSHFIRES ON THE NORTH 
EAST AND GIPPSLAND REGIONS 
In this section we estimate the economic effects of the bushfires by examining their 
impact on Gross Shire Products (GShPs). GShP is the Shire equivalent of a national 
economy’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP is the market value of all final goods 
and services produced in an economy over a period of time (usually one year). It is 
measured either by using the expenditure approach, or the income approach. The 
expenditure approach involves aggregating all spending on final goods and services 
across the economy, while the income approach requires all income to be summed. 
These two methods are equivalent as that act of production always generates an 
equivalent amount of income.  
Each Shire’s GShP is estimate for the financial year 2001-02 by allocating Victoria’s 
Gross State Product (GSP) to the Shire’s. This is done on the basis of the Shire’s Labour 
Force as a proportion of Victoria’s Labour Force, and on the basis of median income 
levels. Next, the shares of GShP contributed by the various industries within each Shire 
are deduced, giving the dollar value of economic activity across the different sectors. 
Then these figures are adjusted for our calculate approximation of the effects of the 
bushfires on economic activity in each industry and in each Shire. This gives quantified 
estimates of the economic effects of the bushfires, and this was done for both the short 
and medium term effects. 
6.1 Estimating Gross Shire Products (GShP). 
As the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census was the most recent source of 
detailed Shire level data, this was used as the basis for the allocation of Victoria’s 2002 
Gross State Product (GSP). Although it may appear that 1996 Census data is out of 
date, it was only used to establish the industrial structure of each Shire, while 2002 data 
was used to ascertain the level of aggregate economic activity. Moreover, as industrial 
structure (which is the importance of each industry within an economy) does not vary 
significantly from year to year, it is unlikely that more recent data would greatly affect our 
results. 
This data was used to obtain estimates of the GShPs for the: 
• Alpine Shire Local Government Area, 
• East Gippsland Shire Local Government Area, 
• Indigo Shire Local Government Area, and 
• Towong Shire Local Government Area. 
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Another complication was that the ABS statistical divisions do not precisely coincide with 
local government areas. Therefore, the ABS statistical divisions of Alpine East and West 
needed to be combined to obtain figures for the Alpine Shire. This was also the case 
with Indigo and Towong Shires, where the ABS divides them both into two statistical 
divisions (Pt A and Pt B). Therefore, both parts also needed to be aggregated for these 
two Shires. It was only for East Gippsland that the ABS statistical division was exactly 
the same as the Local Government Area. Therefore the ABS Local Government Area 
(LGA) Shire boundaries as defined in the 1996 Census were used. In the case of Alpine, 
Indigo and Towong Shires this meant adding together ABS statistical divisions.39 
6.1.1 The data 
The ABS 1996 Census of Population and Housing was used to obtain, Shire Populations 
Shire Labour Forces, Median Shire Individual Weekly Incomes, the State Population, the 
State Labour Force, State Median State Weekly Individual Income and Employed 
Persons by Industry. The ABS Catalogue No.5220.0, Australian National Accounts: 
State Accounts gave us Victoria's Current Prices Gross State Product as at June 2002. 
ABS Catalogue No.3201.0, Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories 
was use to obtain Victoria's Population as at June 2002. 
6.1.2 The method 
The steps involved in obtaining estimates of GShP (Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5) are presented 
here: 
(i) Using 1996 Census data, each Shire’s Labour Force was expressed as a 
proportion of Victoria’s Labour Force. 
(ii) Also using the 1996 Census data, each Shire’s Median Individual Weekly 
Income’s was expressed as a proportion of the equivalent figure for Victoria. 
(iii) The proportions in (i) and (ii) were then multiplied together to give an income 
adjusted Shire Labour Force share. 
(iv) The proportions in (iii) were then used to allocate Victoria’s June 2002 Gross 
State Product (GSP) to each Shire to obtain our estimates of the Gross Shire 
Products (GShP). 
 
Table 1: VICTORIA   
 1996 State Population  4,373,520 
 1996 State Labour Force  2,081,069 
 1996 Median State Weekly Individual Income  $290.0 
   
 Victoria's Population, June 2002.  4,872,538 
 Victoria's Labour Force, June 2002.  2,318,519 
 Victoria's Gross State Product (GSP), June 2002. $ Million.  $183,703.0 
                                                 
39 The ABS 1996 Census Statistical Divisions used in this study may slightly differ from the current local government 
boundaries. This may account for some of the small differences in the figures in this report and current figures.  
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Table 2: EAST GIPPSLAND   East Gippsland LGA 
 1996 Shire Population    37,893 
 1996 Shire Labour Force    15,461 
 1996 Median Shire Individual Weekly Income    $217.0 
 1996 Shire Population as a % of State     0.87% 
 1996 Shire Labour Force as a % of State     0.74% 
 1996 Median Shire Individual Weekly Incomes as a % of State    74.83% 
 1996 Shire income adjusted Labour Force as a % of State    0.56% 
     
 Estimated Shire Population, June 2002.    42,217 
 Estimated Shire Labour Force, June 2002.    17,225 





Table 3: ALPINE  Alpine East Alpine West Alpine LGA 
 1996 Shire Population  13,627 4,530 18,157 
 1996 Shire Labour Force  7,829 2,020 9,849 
 1996 Median Shire Individual Weekly Income  $381.0 $258.0 $355.8* 
 1996 Shire Population as a % of State   0.31% 0.10% 0.42% 
 1996 Shire Labour Force as a % of State   0.38% 0.10% 0.47% 
 1996 Median Shire Individual Weekly Incomes as a % of State  131.38% 88.97% 122.68% 
 1996 Shire income adjusted Labour Force as a % of State  0.49% 0.09% 0.58% 
     
 Estimated Shire Population, June 2002.  15,182 5,047 20,229 
 Estimated Shire Labour Force, June 2002.  8,722 2,250 10,973 
 Estimated Gross Shire Product (GShP), June 2002, $Million. $908.0 $158.6 $1,066.6 
* LGA is a weighted average, where the weights depend on Labour Force Shares  
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Table 4: INDIGO  Indigo Pt A Indigo Pt B Indigo LGA 
 1996 Shire Population  10,289 3,390 13,679 
 1996 Shire Labour Force  4,493 1,591 6,084 
 1996 Median Shire Individual Weekly Income  $274.0 $289.0 $277.9* 
 1996 Shire Population as a % of State   0.24% 0.08% 0.31% 
 1996 Shire Labour Force as a % of State   0.22% 0.08% 0.29% 
 1996 Median Shire Individual Weekly Incomes as a % of State  94.48% 99.66% 95.84% 
 1996 Shire income adjusted Labour Force as a % of State  0.20% 0.08% 0.28% 
     
 Estimated Shire Population, June 2002.  11,463 3,777 15,240 
 Estimated Shire Labour Force, June 2002.  5,006 1,773 6,778 
 Estimated Gross Shire Product (GShP), June 2002, $Million. $374.7 $140.0 $514.7 
* LGA is a weighted average, where the weights depend on Labour Force Shares  
 
Table 5: TOWONG  Towong Pt A Towong Pt B Towong LGA 
 1996 Shire Population  2,292 3,830 6,122 
 1996 Shire Labour Force  1,062 1,720 2,782 
 1996 Median Shire Individual Weekly Income  $274.0 $220.0 $240.6* 
 1996 Shire Population as a % of State   0.05% 0.09% 0.14% 
 1996 Shire Labour Force as a % of State   0.05% 0.08% 0.13% 
 1996 Median Shire Individual Weekly Incomes as a % of State  94.48% 75.86% 82.97% 
 1996 Shire income adjusted Labour Force as a % of State  0.05% 0.06% 0.11% 
     
 Estimated Shire Population, June 2002.  2,554 4,267 6,821 
 Estimated Shire Labour Force, June 2002.  1,183 1,916 3,099 
 Estimated Gross Shire Product (GShP), June 2002, $Million. $88.6 $115.2 $203.8 
* LGA is a weighted average, where the weights depend on Labour Force Shares  
 
Once the estimates of GShP for each Shire were found, they were distributed to the 
various industries based on the number of employees in those sectors. The employee 
numbers in each industry are presented in Table 6, while the proportions are presented 
in Table 7. These employee proportions are then used to distribute the GShPs, with 
these results presented in Table 8. That is, Table 8 has our estimate of GShP across all 
of the different industries in the four Shire LGAs of Alpine, East Gippsland, Indigo and 
Towong. 
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Table 6: EMPLOYED PERSONS BY INDUSTRY   
  Alpine LGA East Gippsland LGA Indigo LGA Towong LGA
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 787 1,841 731 788 
Mining 36 122 12 0 
Manufacturing 1,021 1,211 963 193 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 145 105 42 57 
Construction 486 847 333 135 
Wholesale Trade 336 540 177 113 
Retail Trade 1,002 2,091 612 239 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 1,124 956 267 123 
Transport and Storage 314 455 151 76 
Communication Services 133 162 61 26 
Finance and Insurance 316 281 95 48 
Property and Business Services 896 653 298 72 
Government Administration  and Defense 422 509 300 104 
Education 457 1,125 454 204 
Health and Community Services 835 1,432 720 248 
Cultural and Recreational Services 426 181 61 37 
Personal and Other Services 314 459 146 48 
Non-classifiable economic units 97 160 57 40 
Not stated 104 295 114 33 
          
Total 9,251 13,425 5,594 2,584 
Note: Persons employed differ from Labour Force due to the unemployed.  
 
Table 7: EMPLOYED PERSONS AS A % OF TOTAL EMPLOYED IN EACH SHIRE 
  Alpine LGA East Gippsland LGA Indigo LGA Towong LGA 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 8.5% 13.7% 13.1% 30.5% 
Mining 0.4% 0.9% 0.2% 0.0% 
Manufacturing 11.0% 9.0% 17.2% 7.5% 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 1.6% 0.8% 0.8% 2.2% 
Construction 5.3% 6.3% 6.0% 5.2% 
Wholesale Trade 3.6% 4.0% 3.2% 4.4% 
Retail Trade 10.8% 15.6% 10.9% 9.2% 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 12.2% 7.1% 4.8% 4.8% 
Transport and Storage 3.4% 3.4% 2.7% 2.9% 
Communication Services 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 
Finance and Insurance 3.4% 2.1% 1.7% 1.9% 
Property and Business Services 9.7% 4.9% 5.3% 2.8% 
Government Administration  and Defense 4.6% 3.8% 5.4% 4.0% 
Education 4.9% 8.4% 8.1% 7.9% 
Health and Community Services 9.0% 10.7% 12.9% 9.6% 
Cultural and Recreational Services 4.6% 1.3% 1.1% 1.4% 
Personal and Other Services 3.4% 3.4% 2.6% 1.9% 
Non-classifiable economic units 1.0% 1.2% 1.0% 1.5% 
Not stated 1.1% 2.2% 2.0% 1.3% 
          
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 8: ESTIMATED GROSS SHIRE PRODUCTS BY INDUSTRY ($ million) 
  Alpine LGA East Gippsland LGA Indigo LGA Towong LGA 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $90.7 $140.0 $67.3 $62.1 
Mining $4.2 $9.3 $1.1 $0.0 
Manufacturing $117.7 $92.1 $88.6 $15.2 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $16.7 $8.0 $3.9 $4.5 
Construction $56.0 $64.4 $30.6 $10.6 
Wholesale Trade $38.7 $41.1 $16.3 $8.9 
Retail Trade $115.5 $159.1 $56.3 $18.8 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $129.6 $72.7 $24.6 $9.7 
Transport and Storage $36.2 $34.6 $13.9 $6.0 
Communication Services $15.3 $12.3 $5.6 $2.1 
Finance and Insurance $36.4 $21.4 $8.7 $3.8 
Property and Business Services $103.3 $49.7 $27.4 $5.7 
Government Administration  and Defense $48.7 $38.7 $27.6 $8.2 
Education $52.7 $85.6 $41.8 $16.1 
Health and Community Services $96.3 $108.9 $66.2 $19.6 
Cultural and Recreational Services $49.1 $13.8 $5.6 $2.9 
Personal and Other Services $36.2 $34.9 $13.4 $3.8 
Non-classifiable economic units $11.2 $12.2 $5.2 $3.2 
Not stated $12.0 $22.4 $10.5 $2.6 
          
Total $1,066.6 $1,021.2 $514.7 $203.8 
 
6.2 The effect of the bushfires on Gross Shire Product (GShP). 
The economic effects of the bushfires were examined both in the short term and the 
medium term. The short term was defined as the period when the threat of the bushfires 
first appeared until after the threat had passed. Given that most communities reported 
fighting bushfires continuously for a period of around one month in January and 
February, we have used four weeks to be the short term time period when economic 
activity was affected.  
The medium term was defined as the period after the threat of the bushfires had passed 
(some time in February) until the time of our investigation (the end of May). Therefore, 
we have used 12 weeks to be the medium term time period when economic activity was 
affected by the consequences of the fires. Although we recognise that the economic 
effects of the fires are likely to last for some time into the future, the model we are using 
is not designed for forecasting, therefore we did not attempt to look beyond the present 
in terms of the effects of the fires on economic activity. 
Our approach endeavours to look at the effects of the bushfires in isolation to that of 
other factors that are likely to have affected economic activity in the Shires in recent 
times. That is, we were trying to abstract from the effects of such things as the drought 
and the general tourism downturn due to security concerns. Using economic jargon, we 
are trying to look at the effects of the fires ‘with all other things constant’. To do this we 
used the 2001-2002 financial year as our point of comparison. Therefore, we are 
assuming that economic activity in January to May 2002-2003 would have been the 
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same as it was in 2001-2002 if it were not for the fires, and we are trying to quantify this 
difference. 
The GShPs, which are our measure of the economic activity, are flow variables. That is, 
GShP is the dollar value of either spending or income earned in a Shire over a period of 
time (usually one year). Although the fires caused substantial damage to both publicly 
and privately owned infrastructure as well as the natural environment, for the purposes 
of this part of the analysis this is not included. This is because infrastructure is a stock 
variable. The fire damage to infrastructure is still important, but for this section of the 
study its relevance is confined to the extent to which fire damage has affected the flow 
variable of GShP. 
The next step involved estimating the effects of the bushfires on the production levels in 
the various industries across the four Shires. This was done both for the short and 
medium term. The short term was defined as the period when the threat of bushfires first 
appeared until after it had passed. Given that most communities reported fighting 
bushfires continuously for a period of around one month in January and February this, 
we have used four weeks to be the short term time period when economic activity was 
being affected. Even though many people may not have been fighting fires for the entire 
four weeks, we believe it is a reasonable assumption that economic activity in the 
regions was severely affected for this length of time, as almost all of the people we 
obtained information from said that all of the efforts of the local communities were 
devoted to the bushfires over this period. If this were the case it is difficult to see how 
normal economic activity could have occurred over this time. 
In this section we have estimated broad-brush changes to economic activity across the 
different sectors within each Shire. These estimates have been derived from information 
already described in the earlier parts of this report and from our survey results (Appendix 
5). That is, the information has been obtained from them following sources. 
• Focus group meetings and interviews conducted by our researchers in the North 
East and Gippsland regions, see sections 4 and 5 of this report. 
• Information collected by the Ministerial Taskforce 
• Information from the submissions to the State Government Inquiry from the 
Shires of Alpine and East Gippsland  
• The responses to the surveys that we distributed. The distributed surveys can be 
found in Appendix 4, while a selection of the responses is in Appendix 5. 
Although we endeavoured to survey bushfire affected business, we were not very 
successful in obtaining large numbers of completed responses. This can be explained as 
we had limited time and resources to distribute surveys and to follow them up, and it 
appears that many people in the bushfire-affected areas had previously cooperated with 
a number of earlier inquiries (including completing other surveys), and this made them 
less inclined to return another survey. 
Nevertheless, there was a lot of useful information in many of the surveys that were 
returned. Here is a brief summary of some information gleaned from a selection of the 
returned surveys presented in Appendix 5. 
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Almost all respondents in retail and tourism reported: 
• 90 to 100 % reduction in short term business 
• 20 to 50 % reduction in medium term business 
• reduced employee numbers 
• they generally provided some free and reduced priced products to people 
effected by the fires (including fire fighters) 
• most employees spent time away from work fighting bush fires. 
Timber industry respondents reported: 
• 80 to 100 % reduction in short term business 
• increases in medium term business (trying to catch up on lost business) 
A winery reported: 
• similar short and medium term loss of business as was the case in other 
categories 
• in addition to these losses they suffered smoke damage to grapes worth many 
thousands of dollars, which was not covered by insurance. 
6.2.1 The short term effects of the bush fires 
It is clear from the information already presented that over the four week short-term 
period when the threat of the fires was imminent, virtually all-economic activity in 
Agriculture and Forestry, Construction, Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants and 
Cultural and Recreation Services ceased. Therefore, we have reduced output in these 
industries by 90 % in Alpine, Indigo and Towong. In East Gippsland we have reduced 
output in these industries by only 80 %. The reason for the smaller reduction in East 
Gippsland is because this Shire contains coastal regions where the fire threat was not as 
great and where there appeared to still be some economic activity due to holidaymakers. 
Where as in the North East Region Shires the fires saw virtually all holidaymakers 
disappear. 
Retail was also badly affected by the lack of visitors, so we have reduced its output by 
50 % in Alpine, Indigo and Towong, and 40 % in East Gippsland (the smaller reduction 
in East Gippsland is for the same reason as described above). It may be argued that the 
influx of the fire fighters over this period could have lead to a boost in some of these 
industries. However, we believe that this was largely offset by many business providing 
free or reduced priced products to people affected by the fires (including fire fighters). 
For most of the remaining industries we have reduced output by only 20 % over the 
short-term period in all four Shires. For of the predominantly public sector and essential 
services industries of Government, Administration and Defence, Eduction, Electricity, 
Gas and Water Supply and Health, output levels were held constant. The reason for this 
is that when constructing the national accounts the ABS values the public sector output 
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at cost. Therefore, as long as the public servants were still being paid over this period 
they were contributing to the GShPs. With the essential services industries of health 
(which also has a large public sector component) and   Electricity, Gas and Water 
Supply we have assumed unchanged output. This is because there may have been both 
increases and decreases in production in these industries. 
We recognise that at an individual firm level we have both under estimated and over 
estimated many of the effects of the bushfires. The figures here are our best guess at 
the total effects based on information obtained from many sources. Therefore, these % 
reductions represent our best estimate of the overall effects of the fires over this four-
week period. 
In summary, in the four-week short term we estimated that the effects of the bushfires on 
output levels were as follows: 
• 90 % reductions in output levels in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing in Alpine, 
Indigo and Towong, 
• 80 % reduction in the output level in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing in East 
Gippsland, 
• 90 % reductions in output levels in Construction in Alpine, Indigo and Towong, 
• 80 % reduction in the output level in Construction in East Gippsland, 
• 50 % reduction in output levels in Retail in Alpine, Indigo and Towong, 
• 40 % reduction in the output level in Retail in East Gippsland, 
• 90 % reductions in output levels in Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants in 
Alpine, Indigo and Towong, 
• 80 % reductions in the output levels in Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 
in East Gippsland, 
• 90 % reductions in output levels in Cultural and Recreation Services in Alpine, 
Indigo and Towong, 
• 80 % reductions in the output levels in Cultural and Recreation Services in East 
Gippsland, and 
• 20 % reductions in the output levels in all other industries in all four Shires, with 
the exception of the predominantly public sector and essential services industries 
of Government, Administration and Defence, Eduction, Electricity, Gas and Water 
Supply and Health. In these industries output levels were held constant. 
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Table 9: Alpine    
ESTIMATED SHORT TERM EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million).40 
  GShP % Reduction Effect 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $90.7 90% -$6.3 
Mining $4.2 20% -$0.1 
Manufacturing $117.7 20% -$1.8 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $16.7 0% $0.0 
Construction $56.0 90% -$3.9 
Wholesale Trade $38.7 20% -$0.6 
Retail Trade $115.5 50% -$4.4 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $129.6 90% -$9.0 
Transport and Storage $36.2 20% -$0.6 
Communication Services $15.3 20% -$0.2 
Finance and Insurance $36.4 20% -$0.6 
Property and Business Services $103.3 20% -$1.6 
Government Administration and Defense $48.7 0% $0.0 
Education $52.7 0% $0.0 
Health and Community Services $96.3 0% $0.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services $49.1 90% -$3.4 
Personal and Other Services $36.2 20% -$0.6 
Non-classifiable economic units $11.2 20% -$0.2 
Not stated $12.0 20% -$0.2 
     
Total $1,066.6  -$33.3 
 
 
                                                 
40 Note that the GShP figures are for a 12 month period, while the output reductions are being applied for only four weeks. 
This is why a 90 % reduction in a $90.7 million industry (Alpine, Agriculture) amounts to only $6.3 million worth of lost 
output.  
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Table 10: East Gippsland    
ESTIMATED SHORT TERM EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million). 
  GShP % Reduction Effect
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $140.0 80% -$8.6
Mining $9.3 20% -$0.1
Manufacturing $92.1 20% -$1.4
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $8.0 0% $0.0 
Construction $64.4 80% -$4.0
Wholesale Trade $41.1 20% -$0.6
Retail Trade $159.1 40% -$4.9
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $72.7 80% -$4.5
Transport and Storage $34.6 20% -$0.5
Communication Services $12.3 20% -$0.2
Finance and Insurance $21.4 20% -$0.3
Property and Business Services $49.7 20% -$0.8
Government Administration and Defense $38.7 0% $0.0 
Education $85.6 0% $0.0 
Health and Community Services $108.9 0% $0.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services $13.8 80% -$0.8
Personal and Other Services $34.9 20% -$0.5
Non-classifiable economic units $12.2 20% -$0.2
Not stated $22.4 20% -$0.3
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Table 11: Indigo    
ESTIMATED SHORT TERM EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million). 
  GShP % Reduction Effect
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $67.3 90% -$4.7 
Mining $1.1 20% $0.0 
Manufacturing $88.6 20% -$1.4 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $3.9 0% $0.0 
Construction $30.6 90% -$2.1 
Wholesale Trade $16.3 20% -$0.3 
Retail Trade $56.3 50% -$2.2 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $24.6 90% -$1.7 
Transport and Storage $13.9 20% -$0.2 
Communication Services $5.6 20% -$0.1 
Finance and Insurance $8.7 20% -$0.1 
Property and Business Services $27.4 20% -$0.4 
Government Administration and Defense $27.6 0% $0.0 
Education $41.8 0% $0.0 
Health and Community Services $66.2 0% $0.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services $5.6 90% -$0.4 
Personal and Other Services $13.4 20% -$0.2 
Non-classifiable economic units $5.2 20% -$0.1 
Not stated $10.5 20% -$0.2 
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Table 12: Towong LGA    
ESTIMATED SHORT TERM EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million). 
  GShP % Reduction Effect 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $62.1 90% -$4.3 
Mining $0.0 20% $0.0 
Manufacturing $15.2 20% -$0.2 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $4.5 0% $0.0 
Construction $10.6 90% -$0.7 
Wholesale Trade $8.9 20% -$0.1 
Retail Trade $18.8 50% -$0.7 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $9.7 90% -$0.7 
Transport and Storage $6.0 20% -$0.1 
Communication Services $2.1 20% $0.0 
Finance and Insurance $3.8 20% -$0.1 
Property and Business Services $5.7 20% -$0.1 
Government Administration and Defense $8.2 0% $0.0 
Education $16.1 0% $0.0 
Health and Community Services $19.6 0% $0.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services $2.9 90% -$0.2 
Personal and Other Services $3.8 20% -$0.1 
Non-classifiable economic units $3.2 20% $0.0 
Not stated $2.6 20% $0.0 
     
Total $203.8  -$7.4 
 
    
Table 13: ALL SHIRES   
ESTIMATED SHORT TERM EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million). 
  GShP Effect 
Alpine LGA $1,066.6 -$33.3 
East Gippsland LGA $1,021.2 -$27.9 
Indigo LGA $514.7 -$14.0 
Towong LGA $203.8 -$7.4 
    
Total $2,806.3 -$82.6 
The data in Table 13 shows a total reduction in output across all four Shires of $82.6 
million during this four-week period. Although it is true that much of this loss may be 
made up in the subsequent months, for example, there would have been a lot of 
construction activity and tree harvesting that that would have simply been delayed; a 
sizable proportion of the loss would never be made up. Examples of lost income and 
output that is probably gone forever would include the lost revenue associated with 
tourists and the loss and damage to agriculture (grapes, timber, livestock, feed and 
crops). 
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6.2.2 The medium term effects of the bush fires 
The medium term was defined as the period after the threat of the bushfires had passed 
(some time in February) to the present (the end of May). Therefore we have used 12 
weeks to be the medium term time period when economic activity was being affected by 
the consequences of the fires. Again using the information gleaned from the various 
sources mentioned above, we have reduced the output levels of Agriculture and 
Forestry, Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants and Cultural and Recreation Services 
by 25 % over the 12 week medium term period. It is possible that some firms increased 
production after their short term slow down during the fires. However, it appears from our 
research that this was not substantial.  
In summary, in the 12-week medium-term period we estimate that the effects of the 
bushfires on output levels were as follows: 
• 25 % reductions in output levels in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing in all four 
Shires, 
• 25 % reductions in output levels in Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants in all 
four Shires, and 
• 25 % reductions in output levels in Cultural and Recreation Services in all four 
Shires. 
6.2.3 The total effects of the bush fires 
The next step was to add both the short term and medium term effects of the bushfires 
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Table 14: Alpine   
ESTIMATED TOTAL EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million). 41  
  GShP Effect 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $90.7 -$11.5 
Mining $4.2 -$0.1 
Manufacturing $117.7 -$1.8 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $16.7 $0.0 
Construction $56.0 -$3.9 
Wholesale Trade $38.7 -$0.6 
Retail Trade $115.5 -$4.4 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $129.6 -$16.4 
Transport and Storage $36.2 -$0.6 
Communication Services $15.3 -$0.2 
Finance and Insurance $36.4 -$0.6 
Property and Business Services $103.3 -$1.6 
Government Administration and Defense $48.7 $0.0 
Education $52.7 $0.0 
Health and Community Services $96.3 $0.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services $49.1 -$6.2 
Personal and Other Services $36.2 -$0.6 
Non-classifiable economic units $11.2 -$0.2 
Not stated $12.0 -$0.2 
      
Total $1,066.6 -$48.8 




















                                                 
41 Again note that the GShP figures are for a 12 month period, while the output reductions are applied for only the 4 week 
short term period and 12 week long term period. This is why the effects of the reduction are scaled down.  
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Table 15: East Gippsland   
ESTIMATED TOTAL EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million).  
  GShP Effect 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $140.0 -$16.7
Mining $9.3 -$0.1 
Manufacturing $92.1 -$1.4 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $8.0 $0.0 
Construction $64.4 -$4.0 
Wholesale Trade $41.1 -$0.6 
Retail Trade $159.1 -$4.9 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $72.7 -$8.7 
Transport and Storage $34.6 -$0.5 
Communication Services $12.3 -$0.2 
Finance and Insurance $21.4 -$0.3 
Property and Business Services $49.7 -$0.8 
Government Administration and Defense $38.7 $0.0 
Education $85.6 $0.0 
Health and Community Services $108.9 $0.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services $13.8 -$1.6 
Personal and Other Services $34.9 -$0.5 
Non-classifiable economic units $12.2 -$0.2 
Not stated $22.4 -$0.3 
      
Total $1,021.2 -$40.9
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Table 16: Indigo   
ESTIMATED TOTAL EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million).  
  GShP Effect 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $67.3 -$8.5 
Mining $1.1 $0.0 
Manufacturing $88.6 -$1.4 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $3.9 $0.0 
Construction $30.6 -$2.1 
Wholesale Trade $16.3 -$0.3 
Retail Trade $56.3 -$2.2 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $24.6 -$3.1 
Transport and Storage $13.9 -$0.2 
Communication Services $5.6 -$0.1 
Finance and Insurance $8.7 -$0.1 
Property and Business Services $27.4 -$0.4 
Government Administration  and Defense $27.6 $0.0 
Education $41.8 $0.0 
Health and Community Services $66.2 $0.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services $5.6 -$0.7 
Personal and Other Services $13.4 -$0.2 
Non-classifiable economic units $5.2 -$0.1 
Not stated $10.5 -$0.2 
      
Total $514.7 -$19.6
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Table 17: Towong   
ESTIMATED TOTAL EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million).  
  GShP Effect 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing $62.1 -$7.9 
Mining $0.0 $0.0 
Manufacturing $15.2 -$0.2 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply $4.5 $0.0 
Construction $10.6 -$0.7 
Wholesale Trade $8.9 -$0.1 
Retail Trade $18.8 -$0.7 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants $9.7 -$1.2 
Transport and Storage $6.0 -$0.1 
Communication Services $2.1 $0.0 
Finance and Insurance $3.8 -$0.1 
Property and Business Services $5.7 -$0.1 
Government Administration  and Defense $8.2 $0.0 
Education $16.1 $0.0 
Health and Community Services $19.6 $0.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services $2.9 -$0.4 
Personal and Other Services $3.8 -$0.1 
Non-classifiable economic units $3.2 $0.0 
Not stated $2.6 $0.0 
      
Total $203.8 -$11.7
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Table 18: All Shires.   
ESTIMATED TOTAL EFFECT ON GShP ($ Million).  
  GShP Effect 
Alpine LGA $1,066.6 -$48.8 
East Gippsland LGA $1,021.2 -$40.9 
Indigo LGA $514.7 -$19.6 
Towong LGA $203.8 -$11.7 
      
TOTAL $2,806.3 -$121.1
Table 18 tells us that our estimate of the total effect of the bushfires on the level of 
economic activity for the period when the threat arose (some time in January) until the 
present (the end of May), across the Shires of Alpine, East Gippsland, Indigo and 
Towong is lost production and income of $121.1 million.  
The key points about this lost output: 
• This lost output would also have further spillover effects to other industries, both 
within the Shires examined in this study and in other industries right across 
Australia. An estimate of this additional spillover loss to other industries goes 
beyond the scope of the present study, as it would require more complicated 
economic modelling. 
• The negative effects of the bushfires are likely to be felt for some time into the 
future. But as we have not developed a forecasting model we have not attempted 
to measure any effects that go beyond the present. 
• This figure does not include any of the damage or loss to infrastructure, property 
and the natural environment. Fire damage to infrastructure is only relevant is so 
far as it affects GShP. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
This study has highlighted significant social and economic costs resulting from the 2003 
bushfires across the Gippsland and North East Regions.  The study has also found that 
the bushfires are likely to have considerable direct and indirect effects on these regions 
for the long term. Overall, we estimate that the loss of income and production in the 
Shires of Alpine, East Gippsland, Indigo and Towong from the time of the fires to the 
present (May 2003) to be $121.1 million. 
The key points about this lost output are that: 
• It would also have further spillover effects to other industries, both within the 
Shires examined in this study and in other industries right across Australia. An 
estimate of this additional spillover loss to other industries goes beyond the 
scope of the present study, as it would require more complicated economic 
modelling. 
• The negative effects of the bushfires are likely to be felt for some time into the 
future. But as we have not developed a forecasting model we have not attempted 
to quantify any effects that go beyond the present. 
This figure does not include any of the damage or loss to infrastructure, property and the 
natural environment. Fire damage to infrastructure is only relevant in so far as it affects 
GShP. Nor does our total economic effects figure include social costs (family breakdown, 
health impacts, social links and so on). 
The main social effects of the fires included: psychosocial stress, disruption to families, 
adverse impacts on people’s physical health and wellbeing and a fracturing of social 
linkages.   
Families have suffered financially, as a result of job losses and damage to local 
businesses.  While the regional economies are beginning to recover, there is an 
acknowledged need for ongoing financial and economic counselling.  
The strong sense of voluntarism associated with the CFA, Red Cross and St John’s 
Ambulance in rural communities has remained largely intact, notwithstanding local 
volunteers feeling that their efforts were sometimes over-ridden and undervalued by 
officials from Melbourne.  
Local governments have played an important role in making local residents aware of the 
sorts of government assistance available to them for recovery purposes.  As well, they 
have provided important co-ordinating and support roles to local communities during and 
after the fires.   
State government agencies as well as non-government organizations also received 
considerable praise for the many and varied ways they helped to manage and 
implement fire fighting and recovery efforts in local communities. Feedback also 
suggested, however, a number of improvements that could be made to future 
organization and support activities. 
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